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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is dependent on foreign sources for many of its
strategic minerals.' In 1985, for example, this country imported more
than ninety percent of its columbium, manganese, mica, strontium, baux-
ite, cobalt, tantalum and platinum group metals.' Historically, the
United States has relied on several politically unstable or repressive re-
gimes for some of these strategic mineral supplies. For example, in the
early part of this decade, the Republic of South Africa was the dominant
source of American imports of chromium, manganese and platinum
group metals.3 The United States also imported much of its cobalt from
Zaire during the 1980's.4 During this same period, Chile was this coun-
try's largest copper supplier.5 Despite abusive human rights practices6 in
these mineral-rich countries, the United States has continued to import
their minerals, and thus support them economically, while offering only
token signals of disapproval of these countries' human rights abuses.
Consequently, the United States has compromised its national security
by depending on foreign nations for its mineral supply, and has in turn
compromised foreign policy by supporting repressive regimes.7
Unfortunately, the United States has been unable to reduce its de-
pendence on foreign sources of strategic minerals because many minerals
are produced by just a few countries, thus restricting our government's
options.8 During the past fifty years, Congress has enacted several stat-
1. Strategic minerals are defined as minerals " 'for which the quantity required for essen-
tial military and civilian uses with no available economic substitutes exceeds the reasonably
secure domestic and foreign sources of supply.'" B. DICKERSON & C. O'BRIEN, OTA RE-
PORT, EXPLORATION FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS at 1 (no date) (Office of Technology As-
sessment Working Paper) (quoting Office of Technology Assessment's definition) (Cong. Info.
Serv. (CIS) J952-56 1985).
2. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL COMMODITY SUM-
MARIES 1986 2 (1986) [hereinafter MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986]. For uses of
selected strategic minerals, see infra note 10.
3. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2, at 34, 98, 118.
4. Id. at 38.
5. Id. at 42.
6. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of how U.S. dependence
on other countries for its strategic minerals has affected our national security. For a discussion
of U.S. foreign policy and strategic mineral vulnerability, see infra notes 224-60 and accompa-
nying text.
8. South Africa possesses approximately 84% of the world's known resources in shipping
grade chromium, 71% of the world's identified land-based manganese resources and 81% of
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utes that have attempted to deal with our mineral dependency. Gener-
ally, however, these legislative efforts have been ineffective. As a result,
the lack of an effective strategic mineral policy has left the United States
dangerously dependent on a handful of countries for several essential
minerals.
This Comment will examine the United States' dependence on stra-
tegic minerals, the goals of our government's present strategic mineral
policy and determine whether those goals have been met. The Comment
will then present a number of proposals which would properly balance
the United States' need to import strategic minerals against other poten-
tially conflicting national policy concerns.
II. AMERICAN DEPENDENCE ON STRATEGIC MINERALS
The United States imports more than thirty-three strategic minerals
from other countries. Thirteen are essential to the national economy,
and their supply is severely limited and vulnerable to interruption.9 Co-
balt, chromium, manganese and platinum group metals are considered
"first tier" minerals because of their importance to the U.S. economy.'
0
The United States needs "first tier" minerals for both militaryI I and civil-
ian uses.' 2 While the United States must import nearly all of its "first
the world's known platinum group metals resources. Zaire, Cuba and the USSR control ap-
proximately one half of the world's known reserves of cobalt. See generally MINERAL COM-
MODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2.
9. CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIC
MATERIALS: TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY 11 (1985) (CIS J952-
27 1985) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
10. Id. Chromium is used in the production of stainless steel, superalloys and as a chemi-
cal in pigments, metal treatments and leather tanning. Id. at 12-13. Platinum group metals
are used for catalytic applications in petroleum refining, chemical processing and automotive
exhaust treatment. Id. Cobalt is a critical additive in various superalloys, a binder for tung-
sten carbide tools, a catalyst in petroleum refining and chemical manufacturing and a pigment
used in paints. Id. at 13. Manganese is used as an alloy in steel and other metals, and in the
manufacture of batteries and chemicals. Id.
11. In the late 1970's, the mineral requirements for the F 100 turbofan jet fighter engine
included 5366 pounds of titanium, 5204 pounds of nickel, 1656 pounds of chromium, 910
pounds of cobalt, 720 pounds of aluminum, 171 pounds of columbium and 3 pounds of tanta-
lum. SUBCOMM. ON MINES AND MINING, COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
H.R., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY: NATIONAL POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS 79 (Comm. Print No. 9 1980) (CIS H442-10 1980) [hereinafter U.S. MINERALS
VULNERABILITY].
12. The largest end use of platinum group metals has been in the manufacture of automo-
bile catalytic converters. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2, at 119. In
1981, for example, 32% of the 1.92 million troy ounces (one troy ounce is equal to 1.09714
avoirdupois ounces (U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, A DICTIONARY OF
MINING, MINERAL, AND RELATED TERMS 1169 (1968))) used by the United States contrib-
uted to the manufacture of catalytic converters. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 14.
November 1987] STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY
tier" minerals, the Soviet Union is almost totally independent of foreign
sources for the same minerals.
1 3
As we approach the twenty-first century, the United States will be-
come increasingly dependent on foreign mineral sources. 4 As American
strategic mineral consumption increases, 5 we will become even more de-
pendent on a handful of countries whose political structures have re-
cently experienced volatile changes or whose mineral shipments have
been affected by political upheavals in neighboring countries. 6 In the
past twenty-five years, the United States' supply of strategic minerals has
been severely disrupted four times. 7 It is quite possible that strategic
mineral supplies could be disrupted again. As human rights abuses in
South Africa18 and Zaire 9 mount, the probability of political upheaval
13. See III U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK
1984, AREA REPORTS: INTERNATIONAL 829-64 (1984) for mineral production and trade in-
formation. Estimated mineral trade, production and consumption figures for the Soviet Union
in 1984 indicated that it imported roughly half of its cobalt requirements, while it actually
exported chromium, manganese and platinum group metals. In 1983, the United States was
one of the largest importers of Soviet platinum group metals exports. Id. at 838.
14. American demand for chromium is expected to double between 1981 and the turn of
the century. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. Manganese requirements are also expected to
rise significantly by the year 2000. Id. Cobalt demand in the United States is expected to grow
more slowly in the future, but platinum group metals requirements will more than double for
uses in catalytic converters and in the chemical industry by 1995 if current trends continue.
Id. at 13-14.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 83. In 1976, insurgents from Angola invaded Shaba province in Zaire and dis-
rupted Zaire's cobalt exports. Id. t 99. The strife in Angola also affected railroad shipments
of cobalt from Zaire and Zambia when, in 1975, the Angolan rebels shut down the Angolan
railroad, a major artery for shipment of Central African minerals. Id. at 97.
17. Id. at 15. In 1949, the Soviet Union halted exports of manganese and chromium to the
United States as the Cold War enveloped the two countries. From 1966 to 1971, the United
States boycotted chromium exports from Rhodesia in an effort to apply pressure to the white
minority government's exclusion of blacks in the political process. Id. To make up for the loss
of Rhodesian chrome, the United States sold off part of its stockpiles and U.S industry turned
to the Soviets for additional chromium imports. In 1969, Canadian nickel miners went on
strike. Id. at 16. The United States, which relied almost exclusively on nickel from Canada,
had to reduce its domestic stockpiles to compensate for the diminished supply from Canada.
The 1978-79 cobalt "shortage" was caused by rebel unrest in Zaire. Id. Although cobalt
production in Zaire actually increased during this period, panic buying pushed the price of
cobalt well above its normal price. After the United States halted sales of cobalt from its
stockpile, private industry was forced to recycle cobalt and to find alternatives for the metal in
many of its products. Id. at 15-17.
18. See, e.g., The Human Rights Situation in South Africa, Zaire, the Horn of Africa, and
Uganda: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations
and the Subcomm. on Africa of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H.R., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-26
(1984) (statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs) (CIS H381-53 1985) [hereinafter Human Rights Situation].
19. Id. at 66-78 (statement of Helen E. Scoville, Africa area coordinator, Amnesty Int'l).
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accompanied by mineral supply disruptions increases. 20
Mindful of potential strategic mineral supply disruptions, the Rea-
gan Administration has adopted a policy of gentle persuasion or "con-
structive engagement" toward several countries that produce important
strategic minerals. In reality, the United States has done little more than
mildly encourage these countries to improve human rights conditions.
2 1
Although Congress has recently taken more affirmative action concern-
ing human rights violations in South Africa, U.S. foreign policy on
human rights in strategic mineral producing countries remains weak.2 2
20. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., U.S. MINER-
ALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA 11-15, (Comm. Print 1982) (CIS S382-32 1982) [herein-
after U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA].
21. For example, the United States has adopted a policy of quiet diplomacy or construc-
tive engagement with the governments of Zaire, South Africa and Chile. Concerning South
Africa, Vernon Walters, former Ambassador-at-Large, expressed the Reagan Administration's
view that:
Political and economic stability in South Africa is our best insurance against
harmful disruptions in the supply of critical materials from that country. True sta-
bility can only be attained when all people of South Africa are allowed to exercise
their legitimate political and economic rights. Through our policy of constructive
engagement with South Africa, we are helping to foster peaceful change in this direc-
tion as best we can.
Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials: Hearings Before the Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, United States Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) (statement of Vernon
A. Walters, former Ambassador-at-Large, Dep't of State) (CIS 5311-4 1984) [hereinafter Geo-
politics]. Similar rhetoric can be found in Reagan Administration testimony concerning Zaire.
Human Rights Situation, supra note 18, at 15-17 (statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs). The Reagan Administration's
policy toward Chile is also one of tolerance accompanied by gentle prodding. Human Rights
in Chile: Hearing before the Subcomms. on Human Rights and International Organizations
and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H.R., 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 110 (1985) (Appendix 1: Responses From the Department of State to Questions Submit-
ted by Representative Gary L. Ackerman) (CIS H381-58 1985) [hereinafter Human Rights in
Chile]. While the United States produces most of the copper it needs, Chile provides the bulk
of U.S. imports from foreign sources. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2,
at 42.
22. In October 1986, Congress voted to override President Reagan's veto of a Senate bill
which imposed sanctions on South Africa. While the bill included measures to boycott South
African exports of iron, steel, coal and uranium, minerals such as chromium, manganese, plati-
num and diamonds were conspicuously absent from the list. See Anderson, Willenson, Whit-
more & Getz, At Last, Sanctions, NEWSWEEK, October 13, 1986, at 49. The Senate bill
appeared to be more of a symbolic action of U.S. opposition to apartheid than a genuine effort
to impose serious economic hardship on South Africa. Indeed, four years earlier, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee concluded that a worldwide boycott of South African strategic
minerals would never be effective because Europe, Japan and the United States heavily depend
on South African chromium, manganese, vanadium, platinum group metals, coal and ura-
nium. U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 20, at 9. The Foreign
Relations Committee ajso stated that:
[D]isruptions in our supply of minerals are most likely to come about if change is
violent, and.., are more likely to occur the longer change is prevented and the more
November 1987] STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY
As a result, the United States has been criticized for having a double
standard toward human rights violations.23 For example, while the
United States has aggressively endorsed an economic boycott of Nicara-
gua to force changes in human rights conditions there, the United States
has done comparatively little to bring about changes in Chile's treatment
of human rights.24
Obviously, U.S. foreign policy toward strategic mineral producing
countries is not entirely controlled by our dependence on their mineral
wealth. However, this nation's foreign policy decisions can be signifi-
cantly affected by our dependence on foreign strategic mineral sources.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY
For nearly fifty years, the United States has had some form of strate-
black advocates of change see... the United States... as being disinterested in such
change.
... [E]conomic sanctions, or even discouragement of U.S. investment in South
Africa, is probably not productive, but.., symbolic actions to indicate our disap-
proval of the apartheid system should be sought rather than avoided.
Id. at 18-19.
While Congress may have changed its mind about implementing sanctions against South
Africa, the effect of boycotting South African uranium and coal is not likely to cause the
United States any major problems considering the size of U.S. domestic coal and uranium
resources. The net result of a boycott of South African coal and uranium is largely symbolic.
23. See, e.g., Review of State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1981: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-81 (1982) (statement of Donald L.
Ranard, Director, Center for International Policy) (CIS H381-73 1982). Mr. Ranard, in eval-
uating State Department country reports for human rights practices, stated that "the State
Department is as guilty of the use of double standards [toward human rights] as are those it
seeks to blame for similar bias." Id. at 78. He noted that the United States mounted an
ostentatious campaign against human rights violations in Poland and against the arrest of
Polish labor leader Lech Walesa. Meanwhile, the United States followed a course of quiet
diplomacy when the pro-American South Korean government imprisoned moderate Korean
opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung. Id. at 78-79.
24. Disparate application of U.S. foreign policy is evident from State Department answers
to questions posed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning U.S. foreign policy
toward Chile and Nicaragua:
Q. Mr. Secretary,... I have not heard any real tough message coming out of this
Administration concerning the gross violations of rights in Chile? You manage to
put this apparatus together concerning Nicaragua. Why is there a double standard?
A. - The Administration has only one standard with regard to Chile, Nicaragua,
other countries in the region.
... [W]e do not see a parallel between the position of the Sandinista regime in Nica-
ragua and the position of the military government of Chile. There is a commitment
in Chile to a democratic transition process, on the part of both the government and
the democratic forces outside of government. In Nicaragua, the only commitment to
democracy to be found lies outside of government.
Human Rights in Chile, supra note 21, at 110.
112 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:107
gic mineral policy.2" The focus of this policy has been on a national
stockpile for strategic minerals. The stockpile, created by Congress in
1939, is composed of eighty mineral commodities26 and is currently
worth over $11 billion. 7 In addition to establishing a national strategic
mineral stockpile, Congress enacted a series of federal statutes to reduce
U.S. dependence on foreign minerals. These statutes have reflected the
shifting pattern of political attitudes toward the national stockpile and
the policy goals of strategic mineral independence.
A. Early Development of US. Strategic Mineral Policy: 1939-1951
In 1939, Congress passed the Strategic Materials Act.28 The Act
created a national stockpile of strategic materials and authorized the gov-
ernment to determine the quality and quantity of materials to be stock-
piled.2 9 In 1946, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to building a
national stockpile when it amended the Strategic Materials Act by pass-
ing the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act. 3° The 1946 Act
stressed the importance of lessening American dependence on foreign
25. CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL
NONFUEL MINERALS: PROBLEMS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 8 (1983) (CIS J932-34 1983)
[hereinafter NONFUEL MINERALS].
26. Id. at 7-8.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Ch. 190, 53 Stat. 811 (1939) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
29. NONFUEL MINERALS, supra note 25, at 8. The Act's stated purpose was to:
[P]rovide for the common defense by acquiring stocks of strategic and critical materi-
als essential to the needs of industry for the manufacture of supplies for the armed
forces and the civilian population in time of a national emergency, and to encourage,
as far as possible, the further development of strategic and critical materials within
the United States for common defense.
Strategic Materials Act, ch. 190, 53 Stat. 811 (1939) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-
98h (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
30. Ch. 590, 60 Stat. 596 (1946) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)). The new Act broadened the scope of the original 1939 Act by adding the
terms, "retention" and "conservation" to the earlier objectives of the policy. The new declara-
tion of policy stated:
That the natural resources of the United States in certain strategic and critical mater-
ials being deficient or insufficiently developed to supply the industrial, military, and
naval needs of the country for common defense, it is the policy of the Congress and
the purpose and intent of this Act to provide for the acquisition and retention of
stocks of these materials and to encourage the conservation and development of
sources of these materials within the United States, and thereby decrease and prevent
wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States upon for-
eign nations for supplies of these materials in times of national emergency.
Id. at 596. The Act also called for the "scientific, technologic, and economic investigations
concerning the extent and mode of occurrence, the development, [and] mining ... of ores...
essential to the common defense or the industrial needs of the United States." Id. at 599.
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sources by developing domestic sources of strategic minerals.3
The Defense Production Act of 195032 (DPA) supported the princi-
ples behind the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Acts. The
DPA gave the President broad powers to encourage development of min-
eral resources and their production during times of war.33 The DPA also
encouraged domestic mining of strategic minerals. Through the use of
direct federal subsidies, purchase commitments and loan guarantees,34
the DPA contributed to the nation's war effort during the Korean con-
flict and stimulated domestic development of minerals.35 A few years
after Congress passed the DPA, domestic aluminum production doubled,
domestic copper mining capacity increased twenty-five percent, tungsten
mining quadrupled, and a new nickel and a titanium mining industry
developed.3 6
B. A Change in Focus of U.S. Strategic Mineral Policy: 1951-1974
Beginning in 1951, the focus of American strategic mineral policy
toward building and maintaining the national stockpile changed. In
1951, the President's Materials Policy Commission ("Paley Commis-
sion") endorsed a policy that the United States should obtain strategic
minerals "'at the least cost possible for equivalent values.' "" The net
result of this policy shift was that domestic production of strategic min-
erals no longer had priority over lower-cost foreign sources of the same
minerals.38
While the Paley Commission realized that the United States could
never be self-sufficient in many strategic minerals, it underestimated our
country's ability to develop its own mineral resources.39 The Paley Com-
mission, as a result of its inaccurate predictions of domestic mineral pro-
31. Id.
32. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061 et seq.
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
33. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 340. To encourage development of mineral resources,
the Act authorized loans and loan guarantees for expansion of capacity, development of tech-
nological processes or the production of essential materials including the exploration, develop-
ment and mining of strategic minerals. Id. See also supra note 32, at 801.
34. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 30.
35. McClure, Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical Materials, 19 IDAHO L. REv. 417, 428
(1983).
36. Id.
37. NONFUEL MINERALS, supra note 25, at 9. The effect of the Paley Commission's policy
was to encourage the United States to purchase lower-cost minerals from foreign sources
where the price for domestic minerals was in excess of foreign prices. Id.
38. Id.
39. See U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at 9. The Paley Commission
predicted that the United States would be largely dependent on imports of lead and copper by
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duction and its adoption of President Truman's policy of free world trade
and international cooperation, proposed a policy of importing strategic
minerals to meet domestic strategic mineral requirements.40
In 1954, Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act.4 This Act established a bartering system by which sur-
plus American farm goods were traded for foreign strategic minerals. By
1961, the strategic stockpile contained over $200 million worth of strate-
gic materials which were obtained through bartering.42 As farm sur-
pluses dwindled in the early 1970's, the barter program was suspended
by the government. Recently, however, Congress has attempted to re-
vive the bartering system.43
Grain was not the only commodity offered in exchange for strategic
minerals; military supplies were also offered. In 1974, Congress passed
the Foreign Assistance Act" which intended, among other things, to
phase out military grant assistance to foreign countries. 4 Despite the
reduction in foreign military assistance, Congress gave the President au-
thority to trade military supplies for foreign strategic materials.
46
The government was also responsible for revising strategic mineral
stockpile goals several times within a period of less than twenty years.
Prior to 1962, stockpile objectives for specific strategic materials were
kept secret.4' Before 1958, however, the general goal of the stockpile was
to accumulate a five-year supply of critical materials. In 1958, this goal
1977. Instead, the United States led the world in copper and lead production from 1952, the
year of the Paley Report, through 1977. Id. at 9 n.15.
40. See id. at 9.
41. Ch. 469, 68 Stat. 454 (1954) (now scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
42. McClure, supra note 35, at 430.
43. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. In 1981, for example, the United States traded $47
million worth of dairy products for bauxite from Jamaica. During the 98th Congress, approxi-
mately 20 barter bills were introduced. In addition to congressional interest in bartering for
strategic materials, the Reagan Administration has established a working group on barter to
review proposals on a case by case basis. Id.
44. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
45. S. REP. No. 1299, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6674, 6675.
46. Section 2423 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the President determines
it is in the United States national interest, he shall furnish assistance under this chap-
ter or shall furnish defense articles or services under the Foreign Military Sales Act
pursuant to an agreement with the recipient of such assistance, articles, or services
which provides that such recipient may only obtain such assistance, articles, or serv-
ices in exchange for any necessary or strategic raw material controlled by such
recipient.
22 U.S.C. § 2423 (1982).
47. A. JORDAN & R. KILMARX, STRATEGIC MINERAL DEPENDENCE: THE STOCKPILE
DILEMMA 42 (1979) [hereinafter JORDAN & KILMARX].
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was reduced to three years, and in 1972, the goal established for the
stockpile called for only a one-year supply of critical materials.48
Subsequent congressional examinations revealed that not only did
general strategic mineral goals fluctuate, but stockpile objectives for spe-
cific minerals also varied from year to year.4 9 The erratic changes in
stockpile objectives suggest that factors other than national security in-
terests may have guided many sales of strategic minerals made by the
President." For instance, during the Vietnam War, stockpiled supplies
of aluminum, copper and nickel were eliminated by President Nixon.
Some senators suggested that the minerals were declared as surplus and
sold from the stockpile because of their ease of liquidation, rather than
because they were actually in excess of needed amounts. 1 President
Nixon's motive for selling the minerals may have been to balance the
budget and improve foreign exchange balances."
During the early 1970's, while the size of the strategic stockpile de-
creased and dependence on foreign sources for strategic minerals in-
creased, Congress made a well-meaning but ineffective attempt to enact
legislation that would encourage domestic production and conservation
of strategic minerals. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 197011
(MMPA) established the national policy goals of
foster[ing] and encourag[ing] private enterprise in (1) the devel-
opment of economically sound and stable domestic mining,
minerals, metal and mineral reclamation industries, (2) the or-
derly and economic development of domestic mineral re-
sources, reserves, and reclamation of metals and minerals to
help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and environmen-
48. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. The one-year level was based on President Nixon's
philosophy that any war would last only one year and that alternate sources and methods
would be found to overcome any shortages in strategic minerals. McClure, supra note 35, at
448.
49. JORDAN & KILMARX, supra note 47, at 42-45. An example of the erratic fluctuations
in stockpile objectives for various strategic minerals is typified by the stockpile objectives for
platinum. In 1951, platinum objectives were at 790,000 troy ounces. By 1956, however, plati-
num objectives were at 235,000 troy ounces and dropped even further in 1958 to 154,000 troy
ounces. Stockpile objectives for platinum increased to 555,000 troy ounces by 1969, but
dropped again to 187,500 troy ounces in 1973. Id. at 43-44.
50. Id. at 42. Possible nonsecurity considerations include: "'purchase of materials to im-
prove U.S. relations with other countries; the sale of commodities in an effort to control prices
or reduce inflation; and the sale of commodities to help balance the national budget, since
proceeds from sales revert directly to the general funds of the Treasury.'" Id. at 58 (quoting
Sen. McClure).
51. Id. at 42, 58.
52. Id. at 58.
53. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982).
November 1987]
116 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:107
tal needs, (3) mining, mineral, and metallurgical research, in-
cluding the use and recycling of scrap to promote the wise and
efficient use of our natural and reclaimable mineral resources,
and (4) the study and development of methods for the disposal,
control, and reclamation of mineral waste products, and the
reclamation of mined land .. .
While the MMPA gave the Secretary of the Interior responsibility
"to carry out this policy when exercising his authority under such pro-
grams as may be authorized by law other than this section," the Secre-
tary denied that he had any broad authority to implement the Act.5
Congress intended to use the MMPA to establish a broad overall na-
tional mineral policy.56 However, the executive branch gave the Act lit-
tle or no priority, and American strategic mineral dependence
increased. 7 Had the Department of Interior carried out the policy goals
of the Act, United States' dependence on foreign strategic mineral
sources might have been reduced in the 1970's.
After the 1973-74 oil embargo, Congress enacted the National Com-
mission on Supplies and Shortages Act of 1974.58 Congress reported that
the "United States is increasingly dependent on the importation from
54. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1442, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5792, 5792-93.
55. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982). In a letter to the Chairman of the Mines and Mining Subcom-
mittee of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, the Secretary of the Interior explained
the limitations of his duties under the Act:
I also want to note that, while P.L. 91-631 makes the declaration of a "Federal Gov-
ernment" policy, the only specific mandate within that Act is to the Secretary of the
Interior. That mandate is twofold. First, it requires that I submit an Annual Report
to the Congress. Second, it requires me to carry out the policy objectives set forth in
the Act in "exercising authority under such programs as may be authorized by law
other than this Act." The Act does not provide to the Secretary of the Interior any
authority or supervisory responsibilities over other Federal Departments as they ex-
ercise their authorities in carrying out responsibilities which affect mineral policy.
This is a very critical distinction and one that must be clearly understood.
U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at 16-17.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1442, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5792, 5792.
57. U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at X-XI. The Subcommittee on
Mines and Mining was not complimentary in its evaluation of the Department of Interior's
implementation of the Act's policy goals:
The Department of the Interior with its preeminent concerns for other resources, has
been woefully negligent in the performance of its responsibilities regarding the Na-
tion's minerals. The Department has blatantly ignored the findings and recommen-
dations of numerous expert studies on mineral policy stretching over the past 30
years and has abdicated its responsibilities in implementing the single existing con-
gressional statement of national mineral policy-the Mining and Minerals Policy Act
of 1970.
Id. at XI.
58. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2169 (1982).
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foreign nations of certain natural resources vital to commerce and the
national defense." 59 Congress also was concerned that nations exporting
strategic minerals to the United States could arbitrarily raise the prices of
the minerals to levels that would cause disruption of domestic and for-
eign economies.6 ° The Act established the National Commission on Sup-
plies and Shortages to "report to the President and the Congress on
needed institutional adjustments for examining and predicting shortages
and on the existence or possibility of shortages with respect to essential
resources and commodities."61 Despite Congress' concern over growing
U.S. dependence on foreign nations, the Commission of Supplies and
Shortages concluded that the United States should not become overly
concerned with its increasing demand for foreign natural resources.62
The Commission felt that foreign embargoes, cartels or sustained-price
manipulations were unlikely, and that significant shortages would proba-
bly result only from shifts in supply and demand that exceeded the re-
sponse capabilities of the industry.63 To solve the shortage problem, the
Commission proposed more international investment in mineral develop-
ment rather than increased reliance by the United States on domestic
mineral production.64
C. Reappraisal of United States Strategic Mineral Policy: 1975-1986
1. The national stockpile policy
In 1975, the United States began to reevaluate its strategic mineral
policy. Amidst congressional criticism that a one-year supply of strate-
gic materials in the national stockpile was inadequate, the Ford Adminis-
tration undertook a study of national stockpile policy. In 1976, after the
study was completed, President Ford approved a new stockpile policy
that: (1) required planning to be based on a three-year emergency re-
quirement; (2) would take into account both civilian and defense needs;
and (3) would estimate civilian and defense needs separately.65 During
his administration, President Carter additionally mandated that the
stockpile be ready to accommodate a one year NATO war in Europe
with no more than thirty days advance notice.
66
59. Id. § 2169(b)(1).
60. Id. § 2169(b)(2).
61. Id. § 2169(c).
62. See U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at 11-12 for a discussion of the
Commission's conclusions.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 12.
65. JORDAN & KILMARX, supra note 47, at 46.
66. Id.
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a. the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Revision Act of 1979
Changes in stockpile policy culminated in 1979 when the Strategic
and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979 repealed the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946.67 Echoing the
policy changes of the Ford Administration, the 1979 Act called for presi-
dential consideration of civilian as well as military needs for strategic
materials.6 8 It also authorized the President to stockpile quantities of
strategic and critical materials "sufficient to sustain the United States for
a period of not less than three years in the event of a national emer-
gency."6 9 The Act attempted to curb the executive branch's abuse70 of
the stockpile by limiting the purpose of the stockpile to interests of na-
tional defense rather than for curing economic or budgetary problems. 71
Proceeds from resale of stockpiled materials were to be channeled into a
separate Treasury Department fund (the National Defense Transaction
Fund) rather than into the general fund. 7' The Act also required the
President to notify Congress of any disposals of materials from the
stockpile.73
While the Act encouraged domestic development of mineral re-
sources,74 it also promoted barter as a method for acquiring or disposing
of strategic materials from the stockpile. Congress also prohibited the
President from restricting importation of strategic minerals from any
country from which importation was lawful. 76
b. amendments to the 1979 act
In 1981, Congress amended the 1979 Act to make it more effective
in achieving stockpile goals. Congress eliminated time constraints on the
President for spending the money appropriated by Congress for purchas-
ing materials for the stockpile. Congress also eliminated the provision
which allowed money from the disposal of stockpiled materials to be
transferred from the separate National Defense Transaction Fund to the
67. 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 98a(a) (1982).
69. Id. § 98b(b)(2).
70. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
71. 50 U.S.C. § 98b(b)(1) (1982). See also McClure, supra note 35, at 431.
72. 50 U.S.C. § 98h (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
73. 50 U.S.C. § 98f (1982).
74. Id. § 98g.
75. Id. § 98e(c)(1).
76. Id. § 98h-4.
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general Treasury fund after three years.7 7
Other amendments gave Congress authority to object to presidential
decisions concerning stockpile transactions. 78 Recently, however, Con-
gress' power to veto an action by the executive branch was declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court.79 The Court's decision cast doubt
on the constitutionality of Congress' authority to object to presidential
decisions concerning stockpile transactions.8 0
In 1979, the stockpile needed an additional $12.9 billion worth of
strategic minerals to fulfill the 1979 Act's three-year supply require-
ments. For fiscal year 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed selling
$78 million in surplus materials from the stockpile and purchasing $120
million in needed materials for the stockpile. If this rate were applied
each year after 1985, it would take 100 years to meet the three-year sup-
ply requirements established by the Act.s
2. National mineral policy
In 1977, members of Congress encouraged President Carter to give
priority to meeting the goals of the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of
1970.82 In response to the increasing vulnerability of the United States to
disruptions in its strategic mineral supply, President Carter ordered a
cabinet-level comprehensive review of nonfuel minerals under the super-
vision of the Nonfuel Mineral Policy Coordinating Committee
(NMPCC).83 The NMPCC, however, failed to satisfactorily address the
national security implications arising from increased U.S. dependence on
foreign mineral sources. 84 Like the previous administrations, the Carter
77. McClure, supra note 35, at 432-33. The amendments were introduced by Congress-
man Charles Bennett after he became convinced that the Reagan Administration was attempt-
ing to reduce the budget deficit by selling off more than two billion dollars in excess materials
from the stockpile, keeping the money in the separate Treasury fund for three years and al-
lowing it to automatically transfer to the general Treasury fund after the three years had
lapsed. Once in the general Treasury fund, the money could be used by the President for uses
other than for stockpile purposes. Id. at 433.
78. 50 U.S.C. § 98d(a)(2) (1982).
79. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one-
house legislative veto held unconstitutional because it violated both President's veto power
under presentment clause and bicameral requirement of U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ I & 7).
80. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 98d note (West Supp. 1987).
81. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
82. Santini, The Growing Crisis in the Strategic and Critical Minerals of the United States,
7 J. LEGIS. 63, 65 (1980).
83. Id. The Nonfuel Mineral Policy Coordinating Committee (NMPCC) conducted the
review and Cecil Andrus, then Secretary of the Interior, chaired the review. Id. at 65 n.13.
84. Id. at 65. The House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs noted widespread dissatisfaction with the NMPCC's report. It stated:
The entire effort was a tragic waste that cdst American taxpayers about $3.5 million
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Administration continued to ignore the congressional policy set forth in
the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970-the development of domes-
tic mineral resources.85
a. National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and
Development Act of 1980
In response to growing U.S. dependence on foreign sources for
many of its strategic materials, Congress passed the National Materials
and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980
(NMMPRDA).86 The Act reaffirmed the goals expressed in the Mining
and Mineral Policy Act of 1970 and directed the executive branch to
carry out the goals of the 1970 Act.8 7 While the Mining and Mineral
Policy Act went a long way toward establishing a national mineral pol-
icy, the 1980 Act was Congress' first piece of legislation which addressed
the need for a comprehensive national materials policy.88
The Act states the congressional finding that "the United States
lacks a coherent national materials policy and a coordinated program to
and the loss of some 13,000 person-days. Of the 42 witnesses who testified on the
"Report on the Issues" at the Administration's September 1979 hearings, none con-
sidered the final product adequate. In fact, nearly every witness stated that report
should be withdrawn and completely redone.
The Committee also received testimony from experts representing producing
and consuming mineral industries, academia, and private consultants and institu-
tions. To a witness, these experts took issue with the findings of the Department of
the Interior.
U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at 24.
85. Burling, United States Minerals Policy--A Proposal to Revitalize the Exploration and
Development of Domestic Mineral Resources, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 881, 896 (1982) [hereinafter
Burling I].
86. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 (1982).
87. Section 1605 expressly states that:
[Tihe President shall direct (1) the Secretary of the Interior to act immediately
within the Department's statutory authority to attain the goals contained in section
21a [of the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970] of this title and (2) the Executive
Office of the President to act immediately to promote the goals contained in section
21a of this title among the various departments and agencies.
Id. § 1605.
88. S. REP. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4871, 4872 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 897]. While Congress had previously emphasized
national mineral policy, the scope of the 1980 Act included both mineral and nonmineral
substances:
"[M]aterials" means substances, including minerals, of current or potential use that
will be needed to supply the industrial, military, and essential civilian needs of the
United States in the production of goods or services, including those which are pri-
marily imported or for which there is a prospect of shortages or uncertain supply, or
which present opportunities in terms of new physical properties, use, recycling, dis-
posal or substitution, with the exclusion of food and of energy fuels used as such.
30 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1982).
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assure the availability of materials critical for national economic well-
being, national defense and industrial production .... ,89 Congress also
expressed in its findings that the United States was vulnerable to disrup-
tions in materials supplies because of its dependence on other countries
for many materials essential to national security.90
A declaration of policies followed Congress' findings and included
the goals of: (1) identifying which materials were subject to disruptions
and what measures were necessary to assure their continued availability;
(2) coordinating activities of federal agencies and activities between fed-
eral agencies and the private sector; (3) promoting a vigorous program of
materials research and development; (4) engaging in cooperative research
and development programs with other countries for enacting conserva-
tion measures; (5) promoting and encouraging domestic private materials
enterprises to provide for critical materials needs; and (6) encouraging
federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of domestic re-
sources needed to fill critical materials needs. 91
Congress relied on the President to direct the appropriate federal
departments and agencies to engage in the type of research and activities
needed to accomplish the 1980 Act's goals.92 In directing the President
to implement its policies, Congress sought to involve several independent
executive agencies and departments to implement strategic materials
policy.
93
The NMMPRDA is the most comprehensive statement of United
States strategic mineral policy that Congress has enacted. However,
there is no indication that the Act has had any more success at accom-
plishing its goals than did the Mining and Mineral Policy Act in the
1970's. As the nation's budget deficits increased, the government re-
duced funding for many of the programs needed to carry out the policies
of the 1980 Act.94 Thus, the Reagan Administration has failed to accom-
89. 30 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(6) (1982).
90. Id. § 1601(a).
91. Id. § 1602.
92. Id. § 1603.
93. Id. § 1604(b)-1604(f). See also S. REP. No. 897, supra note 88, at 4875-76.
94. See, e.g., Appropriations for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies: Hear-
ings Before the House Subcomm. on Appropriations, 200, 201 (Feb. 28, 1985) (statement of
Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior) (CIS H181-41.3 1985) [hereinafter Hodel Statement].
The NMMPRDA instructed the Secretary of Interior to:
(1) improve the capacity of the Bureau of Mines to assess international minerals
supplies;
(2) increase the level of mining and metallurgical research by the Bureau of Mines
in critical and strategic minerals; and
(3) improve the availability and analysis of mineral data in Federal land use
decisionmaking.
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plish the goals of the 1980 Act.
b. National Critical Materials Act of 1984
As a result of the government's failure to fully implement the poli-
cies of the NMMPRDA, Congress passed the National Critical Materials
Act of 1984.91 This Act established a National Critical Materials Coun-
cil and gave the President power to appoint the Council's three mem-
bers.96 The 1984 Act authorized the Council to appoint an executive
director who would hire the personnel necessary to carry out the Coun-
cil's functions.97 The Council's responsibilities entailed assisting and ad-
vising the President in establishing national materials policies and
priorities.98 Congress also gave the Council the power to: (1) coordinate
federal materials-related policies, programs and research; (2) review and
appraise federal materials programs pursuant to the NMMPRDA;
(3) monitor and evaluate private and governmental critical materials
needs; (4) advise the President of current mineral and material trends;
and (5) provide reports on materials issues to the President, designated
federal agencies and Congress. 99
30 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1982). For the Bureau of Mines, Secretary of the Interior Hodel pro-
posed for fiscal year 1986 a reduction of thirty-two million dollars from the 1985 appropriated
budget of 136 million dollars. Research programs were among the proposed cuts. Hodel
Statement, supra, at 215.
95. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1985). In passing the Act, Congress noted that:
The current Administration has taken a number of steps to address materials
concerns and to implement P.L. 96-479 [NMMPRDA].
Uinfortunately, as noted in testimony by industry and others, these actions have
been inadequate. While focusing on the important issues of minerals and mining
materials, processing and advanced materials concerns have been largely ignored. Of
four reports and assessments required by P.L. 96-479, only one has been officially
presented to Congress as of October 1983. The Cabinet Council, while potentially
useful as the required coordinating and implementing mechanism, has not been fully
effective. As noted in testimony, the Council has met only infrequently on materials
issues and on an ad hoc basis without permanence or clearly defined lines of commu-
nication with the rest of the Federal Government. Perhaps more important, another
administration with other priorities and organizational ideas could easily abolish
such a mechanism.
In view of this, [this Act] provides the next logical step by establishing statuto-
rily the organizational mechanism to determine materials policies and priorities as
well as responsibilities for implementation of resulting programs. The National Crit-
ical Materials Council established by the legislation also focuses on advanced materi-
als research and technology development in basic and advanced materials industries.
H.R. REP. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2230, 2233-34.
96. 30 U.S.C. § 1802 (Supp. 111 1985).
97. Id. § 1807.
98. Id. § 1803(a).
99. See id.
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While Congress had hoped to establish an effective strategic materi-
als policy, the Reagan Administration was in no hurry to comply. It
took eighteen months for President Reagan to appoint the three-member
Council and for the Council to appoint an executive director. Since then,
two of the Council members have left."° It would appear that the Na-
tional Critical Materials Act of 1984 has not met with any more success
than its predecessors-the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970 and
the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development
Act of 1980.
IV. U.S. STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY GOALS
The basic goal of United States strategic mineral policy is to de-
crease American dependence on foreign strategic mineral sources. To
achieve this goal, the United States must: (1) increase domestic produc-
tion of strategic minerals; (2) decrease domestic consumption of strategic
minerals; and (3) find alternative sources for meeting strategic mineral
needs. While many good proposals have been suggested for reducing
U.S. dependence on strategic minerals, all conflict with previously ex-
isting national goals and laws. In nearly every case, Congress and the
courts appear to have attached greater importance to the competing goal
or law than to the existing laws and policies concerning strategic
minerals.
A. Increasing Domestic Production of Strategic Minerals
The earliest and most commonly cited proposal to decrease depen-
dence on foreign strategic mineral sources is to increase domestic pro-
duction of our own mineral resources.101 When formulating domestic
100. Willenson & Getz, The Mines of Apartheid, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1986, at 30.
101. The Strategic Materials Act of 1939 stated:
That the natural resources of the United States in certain strategic and critical mater-
ials being deficient or insufficiently developed to supply the industrial, military, and
naval needs of the country for common defense, it is the policy of Congress and the
purpose and intent of this Act to provide for the acquisition of stocks of these materi-
als and to encourage the development of mines and deposits of these materials within
the United States, and thereby decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous
and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these
materials in times of national emergency.
Ch. 190, 53 Stat. 811 (1939) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
Since 1939, other statutes have incorporated similar language as part of their policy state-
ment. See Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982); Materials and
Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. § 1602(7) (1982); Na-
tional Critical Materials Act of 1984, 30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6) (Supp. III 1985); Strategic and
Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, ch. 590, 60 Stat. 596, 596 (1946) (codified as amended at
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strategic mineral policy, Congress relied on the Department of Interior
through the United States Bureau of Mines (USBM) and the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) to facilitate development of domestic
mineral resources. The USBM and USGS defined the mineral resources
through scientific, technological and economic studies.102 Beginning
with the Defense Production Act in 1950, Congress encouraged private
enterprise to take an active role in developing domestic strategic mineral
resources.103 Recent statutes concerning strategic mineral policy have
also encouraged private enterprise to develop domestic minerals and
materials industries.1 4
While the objectives of locating and developing domestic mineral
resources have been a part of U.S. strategic mineral policy for nearly
thirty years, it has become progressively more difficult to develop domes-
tic mineral resources in this country. Part of the problem is the escalat-
ing cost of locating new mineral deposits. Mineral deposits were
previously discovered through relatively inexpensive exploration tech-
niques. 10 5 New ore deposits often must be discovered through the use of
50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)); Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Revision Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 98a, 98g (1982); Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932,
64 Stat. 798, 801 (1950) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2093 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)); and the Domestic Minerals Extension Act of 1953, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2181 (1982).
Many authors who have examined the problem of strategic mineral dependence in the
past have advocated a stronger domestic mineral policy. See, e.g., McClure, supra note 35, at
452; Santini, supra note 82, at 66; Burling I, supra note 85, at 881.
102. See Strategic Materials Act, ch. 190, 53 Stat. 811, 812 (1939) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) which states:
[T]he Secretary of the Interior, through the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the
Director of the Geological Survey, is hereby authorized and directed to make scien-
tific, technologic, and economic investigations concerning the extent and mode of
occurrence, the development, mining, preparation, treatment, and utilization of ores
and other mineral substances found in the United States ... which are essential to
the common defense or the industrial needs of the United States ....
Id. Current statutes addressing strategic mineral policy matters also rely on government stud-
ies for support in developing domestic mineral resource policy. See, e.g., National Materials
and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. § 1604(e)-(f) (1982);
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 98g(l)-(3)
(1982). Today, the USBM and USGS continue to be active in investigating both domestic and
foreign nonfuel mineral resources. See Hodel Statement supra note 94, at 213-15.
103. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2092-2093 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Defense Production Act
called for government loans to private business enterprises "for the expansion of capacity, the
development of technological processes, or the production of essential materials, including the
exploration, development, and mining of strategic and critical metals and minerals." Id.
§ 2092. The President was authorized to make purchases and commitments to purchase met-
als and minerals from private enterprise for government use or resale. Id. § 2093(a).
104. See, e.g., National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of
1980, 30 U.S.C. § 1602(6) (1982).
105. Early prospectors searched for quartz or iron oxide stained rock on the ground or in
outcrops. 0. YOUNG, WESTERN MINING 18-19 (1982). Other methods used by prospectors
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sophisticated and expensive exploration techniques. 10 6
Another problem has been the growing number of federal and state
laws passed by Congress and state legislatures to protect the environ-
ment. Many of the laws restrict mineral exploration and development in
this country. The added restrictions increase the costs of discovering and
developing an ore deposit. As a result, the cost of producing the minerals
may exceed their fair market value.
Finally, the private mining industry-the principal force in discov-
ering and developing domestic mineral resources-has experienced un-
precedented economic hardship over the past ten years as lower cost
mineral imports have undercut domestic mineral production. The result
has been an overall decline in domestic mineral exploration and develop-
ment since 1980.107
1. Mineral resources and reserves
With the rapid development of the theory of plate tectonics, 10 8 the
field of geology has undergone a revolution over the past twenty-five
years.109 This revolution has affected the search for strategic minerals.
The application of plate tectonics theory to mineral exploration has ena-
bled geologists to locate new areas in the United States that have a high
included panning for gold placers, looking for characteristic rock formations, observing the
colored alteration products of ore minerals or finding valuable minerals through sheer luck.
Id. at 18-23.
106. While many of the old prospecting techniques are still used by geologists today, new,
sophisticated methods are often used by explorationists searching for concealed ore deposits.
Today, geologists use geochemical sampling and analysis techniques that require computerized
statistical interpretation. A. ROSE, H. HAWKES & J. WEBB, GEOCHEMISTRY IN MINERAL
EXPLORATION 519-533 (2d ed. 1979). Geophysical techniques including electromagnetic, in-
duced polarization, radioactivity and gravity methods are also used by explorationists to locate
ore deposits. See generally D. PARASNIS, PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED GEOPHYSICS (3d ed. 1979).
Recently, satellite remote-sensing techniques have become a valuable means of locating ore
deposits. See, e.g., Conradsen & Harp.Oth, Use of Landsat Multispectral Scanner Data for De-
tection and Reconnaissance Mapping of Iron Oxide Staining in Mineral Exploration, Central
East Greenland, 79 ECON. GEOLOGY 1229 (1984).
107. Houston, Schiller, Atchison, Crawford, Norman & Ryser, The Death of Mining, Bus.
WK., Dec. 17, 1984, at 64 [hereinafter Houston].
108. AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, AGI DATA SHEETS (2d ed. 1982) describes
plate tectonics as
a hypothesis by which Earth's crust and uppermost mantle are divided into a number
of plates.., whose horizontal movement is that of rigid bodies. The plates consist of
both continental and oceanic material. These plates move over a zone within the
upper mantle that has a relatively low resistance to shearing stress. The plates inter-
act along their boundaries with both seismic and tectonic activity. Along some
boundaries, plates are consumed; along others, new crustal material is created.
Along still other boundaries, plates slide laterally past each other.
Id. at 61.1 (citations omitted).
109. P. KING, Preface to THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH AMERICA (rev. ed. 1977).
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potential for ore I I° grade mineralization. Also, recent advances in geo-
chemical, geophysical and remote sensing techniques' I I have enabled ge-
ologists to explore for mineral deposits in places previously thought to be
barren of minerals or depleted from previous mining activities. Conse-
quently, scientists employing a new concept or scientific technique may
discover a new ore deposit in a location where no one previously sus-
pected that one existed."
I2
Mineral exploration techniques have improved over the past twenty-
five years. However, the costs of discovering a significant mineral deposit
have steadily increased. With the exception of gold, the discovery rate
for finding significant deposits of major metals has steadily decreased
since the middle of the last decade.' Given the high cost of searching
for a significant mineral deposit and the low probability of discovering a
significant "first tier" strategic mineral deposit, domestic exploration for
"first tier" strategic minerals is an unattractive investment for most ex-
ploration and mining companies. I"4 Under these circumstances, it is un-
likely that significant discoveries of "first tier" strategic minerals such as
platinum, cobalt, manganese and chromium will occur at any time in the
near future.' '5
2. Federal and state laws
While the likelihood of discovering significant deposits of "first tier"
110. "Ores are rocks and minerals that can be recovered at a profit." C. PARK & R.
MACDIARMID, ORE DEPOSITS 1 (2d ed. 1970).
111. See OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 206-08.
112. Id.
113. Cook, Analysis of Significant Mineral Discoveries in the Last 40 Years and Future
Trends, 38 MINING ENGINEERING 87, 93 (1986). Cook defines a "significant mineral discov-
ery" as one which has a "size and grade [that] would yield more than $500 million in revenue
using average metal prices for the last five years." Id. at 87. Cook's data indicates that the
discovery rate for significant mineral deposits accelerated during the 1950's and reached its
peak in 1962 before declining. Id. at 87, 93. The cost of discovering a significant mineral
deposit, on the other hand, increased from $70 million per discovery to $225 million per dis-
covery in the late 1970's (values expressed in 1982 constant dollars). Id. at 87.
114. See OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 204. There are exceptions to this, however. The
Stillwater Complex, a chromium, platinum-palladium deposit located in Montana, was exten-
sively explored by several companies including Anaconda Minerals Co., Johns-Manville and
Chevron Resources Co. during the early 1980's, and plans were made to eventually mine por-
tions of the complex. Id. at 196-98.
115. See id. at 204. Part of the reason for the low probability of finding "first tier" mineral
deposits is that the type of geologic environments conducive to hosting significant amounts of
such deposits are not present in the United States. A. SILVERMAN, J. SCHMIDT, P. QUENEAU
& W. PETERS, STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MINERAL POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT
TO CHROMIUM, NICKEL, COBALT, MANGANESE, AND PLATINUM 4 (Office of Technology
Assessment Working Paper) (1983) (CIS J952-52 1985).
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strategic minerals in this country is low, the United States has many
other important minerals that could be developed were it not for restric-
tive federal and state laws. The laws--enacted to further this country's
goals of preserving wilderness areas, cleaning up the environment and
increasing revenue-either have contributed to an outright ban on min-
eral exploration or have made the costs of mineral exploration and devel-
opment prohibitively expensive.
a. federal laws and policy goals
Mineral exploration and mining in this country have traditionally
been accomplished under the General Mining Law." 6 Enacted by Con-
gress in 1872, the General Mining Law has been subject to criticism both
by authors opposing and by authors favoring mineral exploration and
development.i" 7 Despite the General Mining Law's uncanny longevity,
subsequent federal laws have severely limited its original purpose of al-
lowing "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United
States ... [to] be free and open to exploration and purchase ...by
citizens of the United States .... ,,1
Since 1872, Congress has narrowed the focus of the General Mining
Law by removing selected minerals from its coverage and by excluding
some federal lands from development of potential mineral resources. In
1920, the Mineral Leasing Act' 19 removed coal, oil, gas, phosphate, oil
shale, sodium, sulfur and potash from location 20 under the General
Mining Law and subjected them to stricter control under a leasing sys-
tem. 2' In 1955, the Common Varieties Act 22 further narrowed the
scope of the General Mining Law by allowing the extraction of sand,
stone, gravel, pumice and petrified wood from federal land through a
system of contracts based on competitive bidding.'23
While limiting the number of minerals covered by the General Min-
116. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
117. See, e.g., Braunstein, Natural Environments and Natural Resources: An Economic
Analysis and New Interpretation of the General Mining Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1133 (1985)
(arguing that mining law is inadequate to meet contemporary mining concerns); Noble, Envi-
ronmental Regulation of Hardrock Mining on Public Lands: Bringing the 1872 Law Up to
Date, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 145 (1980) (arguing that mining law allows development of
mineral resources at the expense of environmental concerns).
118. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 1, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
119. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
120. See General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. §§ 23, 26, 28 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
121. See Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 182, 184 (1982).
122. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982).
123. See Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1982).
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ing Law, Congress also enacted legislation that affected the amount of
federal land subject to mineral exploration and development. The Sur-
face Resources Act of 1955124 limits the amount of surface disturbance
caused by the prospector's exploration and mining activities on federal
land. Additionally, the 1955 Act subjects mineral exploration activities
to surface-management constraints implemented by the federal agency
responsible for overseeing the land on which the prospector has staked a
claim.12 The Act has been used in the past to limit surface disturbances
of claimants engaged in common prospecting techniques such as trench-
ing, blasting and drilling activities. 126
Severe land use restrictions could effectively block many surface ac-
tivities. 27  As a result, explorationists 128 or prospectors searching for
mineralization concealed beneath a cover of soil may not be able to meet
the requirement that they have made a discovery of a "valuable mineral
deposit" in order to hold their claim under the General Mining Law.
129
124. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1982).
125. Id. §§ 612, 613. Section 612 is especially concerned with management of timber re-
sources on unpatented claims. Id. § 612(c).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1014 (1980). In Richardson, a prospector bulldozed trenches and blasted in an effort to
reveal fresh exposures of rock for examination and geochemical sampling. Because the pros-
pector had bulldozed and excavated large areas of the claim, the court held that the prospec-
tor's methods were "unnecessary and were unreasonably destructive of surface resources," and
enjoined him from continuing his activity. Id. at 295.
127. For example, surface activities such as road building may be prohibited in environmen-
tally sensitive areas. The cost of helicopter transport of drilling equipment to the site of poten-
tial mineralization may be too great to justify evaluation of potential mineral deposits.
Reclamation requirements such as restoring the area to its original contour also may cause
undue expense in areas where the federal agency prohibits heavy machinery.
128. The term "explorationist," as used by this Comment, refers to any individual who is
professionally trained in exploring for and developing mineral resources. Such individuals in-
clude geologists, geophysicists, geochemists and mining engineers. The term "prospector" is
meant to refer to individuals who explore for mineral resources but who lack any formal pro-
fessional training in this field.
129. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Although the General Mining Law requires
that a claimant make a discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit" to lawfully hold the claim, it
is not specific about what constitutes discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit" within the
meaning of 30 U.S.C. § 22. Subsequent case law following enactment of the mining law has
developed two tests to determine whether a person discovered a "valuable mineral deposit."
Under the first test-the "prudent man" test-a "valuable mineral deposit exists where the
mineral found is of such quality and quantity that a person of ordinary prudence would be
justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means with a reasonable prospect of success
in developing a valuable mine." United States v. Parker, 91 Interior Dec. 271, 273 (1984)
(citing Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1905); Castle v. Womble, 19 Pub. Lands
Dec. 455, 457 (1894)).
The second test is the "marketability" test which requires that the prospector be able to
extract, remove and market the mineral at a profit. Parker, 91 Interior Dec. at 273 (citing
United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968)). The controversy over whether a claimant
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In 1964, Congress passed the Wilderness Act 3 ' to establish a na-
tional system for wilderness preservation on federal lands managed by
the Department of Agriculture. The system is comprised of congressio-
nally designated areas of 5,000 acres or more. Each area must have an
undeveloped character that requires management and protection to pre-
serve that character."' The Act effectively withdrew millions of acres of
national forest land from mineral exploration by prohibiting all mineral
exploration and development in designated wilderness areas after De-
cember 31, 1983.132 A total of 9.1 million acres was initially designated
part of the National Wilderness Preservation System under the Act.
13 3
The Act also gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to review addi-
tional roadless areas of more than 5,000 contiguous acres in the national
park system and on federal grazing lands, and to recommend to the Pres-
ident additional areas for wilderness designation.1
34
The proposed wilderness areas were subject to recurring evaluations
for minerals by the USBM and USGS to "determine the mineral values,
if any, that may be present ... ."135 After 1984, however, these evalua-
tions became moot because mining on the lands was prohibited. Thus,
unless mineralization has been discovered and developed prior to 1984,
explorationists have no further opportunity to examine wilderness areas
must meet only one or both requirements for discovery has not been resolved. Judicial inter-
pretations concerning which part of the test should be applied vary. Braunstein, supra note
117, at 1169-72.
Regardless of whether the "prudent man" or "marketability" test applies, the aspiring
claimant must establish that there is indeed mineralization on his proposed claim, or he may
forfeit the right to work the claim. See generally Parker, 91 Interior Dec. 271 (evaluating
evidence for mineralization on several of prospectors' claims). In the early days of the General
Mining Law, this was easily accomplished by examining and sampling the outcroppings of
rocks on the land. Today, with the aid of advanced geophysical and geochemical techniques, it
is possible to identify potential mineralization tens or even thousands of feet below the surface
despite the lack of any surface outcrops of rocks. To actually prove that mineralization exists
below the ground surface which satisfies the discovery requirements for staking a claim, the
prospector or explorationist must dig trenches through the underlying soil in the case of shal-
low mineral deposits. To establish the existence of mineralization at deeper levels, it is neces-
sary to drill into and sample the underlying rocks. In either case, construction of access roads,
trenches and "drill pads" to accommodate the drilling rigs will create significant surface dis-
turbances that an agency could prevent by strict enforcement of the Surface Resources Act or
other similar acts protecting the surface of federal land from undue degradation.
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
131. H.R. REP. No. 1538, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3615, 3615-16.
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).
133. Bennethum & Lee, Is Our Account Overdrawn?, 61 AM. MINING CONG. J. 33, 40
(1975).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1982).
135. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) (1982).
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for mineralization or to develop any new mineral deposits found there.
36
By the end of 1974, Congress had set aside, as wilderness areas, a total of
12.6 million acres of the 742 million acres of public land that had been
subject to the General Mining Law. 137
Congress also gave the Department of the Interior similar authority
to withdraw lands as wilderness areas and to set aside roadless areas as
wilderness study areas when it enacted the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976.131 Under the FLPMA, the Secre-
tary of the Interior is authorized to withdraw land containing 5,000 acres
or more, provided that Congress does not disapprove.'39 The Act also
authorizes the Secretary to review additional roadless areas of 5,000
acres or more. The FLPMA also requires the Secretary to submit his
recommendations for preservation of additional wilderness areas to the
President by October 21, 1991.140
The FLPMA explicitly provides that it is the policy of the United
States to manage public lands "in a manner which recognizes the Na-
tion's need for domestic sources of minerals ... from the public lands
including implementation of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970
as it pertains to the public lands ....""I
The FLPMA, however, also declares that lands under review must
be managed in such a way as
not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation of existing
mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in the manner and
degree in which the same was being conducted on Oct. 21,
1976: Provided, That, in managing the public lands the Secre-
tary shall by regulation or otherwise take any action required to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and
their resources or to afford environmental protection.
42
136. See Bennethum & Lee, supra note 133, at 40-41.
137. Bennethum & Lee, supra note 133, at 34, 40.
138. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
139. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982). The FLPMA specifies that the Secretary of the Interior's
land withdrawals are subject to congressional disapproval. Id. Recent case law probably ren-
ders this an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers because the FLPMA allows
Congress to veto an action it has delegated to an official of the executive branch. See Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1013 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
140. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
141. Id. § 1701(a)(12) (citations omitted).
142. Id. § 1782(c). For a discussion of the Secretary of the Interior's duties under this
section, see Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982); The
Bureau of Land Management Wilderness Review and Valid Existing Rights, 88 Interior Dec.
909 (1981).
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Like the Wilderness Act, the FLPMA required examination of the
designated wilderness study areas by the USBM and USGS to determine
the extent of mineralization on the land prior to withdrawal as wilder-
ness areas.143 It is unclear whether the FLPMA, like the Wilderness
Act, will suspend all mineral exploration and development on designated
wilderness areas. 1"
The overall effect of the Surface Resources Act, the Wilderness Act,
the FLPMA and other congressional legislation145 has been to reduce the
amount of federal land available for mineral exploration and develop-
ment. Of the more than two billion acres of land that make up the
United States, over 700 million acres remain as public land.146 In 1965,
more than ninety percent of the nation's domestic copper, mercury, sil-
ver, molybdenum and potash came from western states which contained
over ninety percent of the nation's public lands. 47 By 1974, approxi-
mately fifty-three percent of the nation's public land had been withdrawn
from exploration and mining activities. 148 Considering the fact that land
withdrawals under the FLPMA began two years later in 1976 and will
continue until at least 1991, it is likely that a significant percentage of
federal land will be withdrawn from the General Mining Law before the
turn of the century.
143. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
144. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) states:
Once an area has been designated for preservation as wilderness, the provisions of the
Wilderness Act which apply to national forest wilderness areas shall apply with re-
spect to the administration and use of such designated area, including mineral
surveys ... and mineral development, access, exchange of lands, and ingress and
egress for mining claimants and occupants.
Id. § 1782(c) (citations omitted). Lands designated as wilderness areas under the FLPMA
may be prohibited from all General Mining Law activities as was wilderness land under the
Wilderness Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1985). Congress' enactment of the Mining and Min-
erals Policy Act of 1970 may preclude a total ban on mining of wilderness areas, but to be
allowed to mine on a designated wilderness area, a claimant must conduct no more activity on
the land than he did on Oct. 21, 1976, and he must not cause any "undue degradation" of the
land. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982). While § 1782 does not define what "undue degradation"
means, it is likely that Congress meant that mining on designated wilderness areas could not
unreasonably diminish the wilderness characteristics of the land. The net effect would appear
to be the same as applying section 1133(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act-to prohibit all mining.
145. See, e.g., Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq.
(1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
(1982).
146. Bennethum & Lee, supra note 133, at 34.
147. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 121
(1970).
148. Bennethum & Lee, supra note 133, at 36.
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b. state regulation of mineral exploration and mining on private land
Not all ore deposits have been found on public land. 149 State and
local laws may have a profound effect on whether mining on private land
will take place. For example, states may exercise their control over min-
ing on private land by imposing environmental restrictions or by taxing
the property or mine production. In the state of Wisconsin, for instance,
recent discoveries of zinc-copper deposits on private land have led to an
extensive regulatory framework of laws addressing many aspects of min-
ing.'50 The state also enacted a sliding-scale severance tax, based on
gross mining revenues, that is among the highest of any state.'51
One of the major ore deposits recently discovered in Wisconsin was
the Crandon ore deposit. In the early 1970's, exploration companies
used airborne geophysical techniques to penetrate the glacial gravels that
overlie much of the rock in northern Wisconsin. 152 As a result of its
exploration efforts, Exxon Coal and Minerals Company (Exxon) identi-
fied a potential ore deposit near Crandon, Wisconsin. Exxon began ex-
ploratory drilling in 1975 and found ore grade zinc and copper within a
month after the drilling program began.15 3 The process of obtaining the
necessary permits to begin mining has taken more than ten years to com-
plete. Since 1975, Exxon has had to file an Environmental Impact State-
ment, 154 a Mine Waste Disposal Facility Feasibility Report,' 55 a Mining
Permit Application, 156 an Air Pollution Control Permit Application, 5 7 a
Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Applica-
149. See, e.g., STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, PUBLIC SERVICE
COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, EXXON COAL AND MINERALS CO.
ZINC-COPPER MINE, CRANDON, WISCONSIN 1, fig. 1-3, (Nov. 1986) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
150. See Evans, Mining in Wisconsin, Where We've Been; Where We're Going, 28 WIs.
ACAD. REV. 3, 7-8 (Dec. 1981). Among the laws passed by the Wisconsin legislature in re-
sponse to new mining activity in the state were a comprehensive metal-mine reclamation law,
1973 WIs. LAWS 318; revised environmental laws, 1977 Wis. LAWS 377, 1978 WIs. LAWS 421;
a mining taxation law, 1977 WIs. LAWS 31; a mining land leasing law, 1977 Wis. LAWS 253; a
mineral exploration law, 1977 WIS. LAWS 422; and a mining tort law, 1979 Wis. LAWS 353.
Id.
151. See R. DAVIDOFF & R. HURDELBRINK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BU-
REAU OF MINES, TAXATION AND THE PROFITABILITY OF MINERAL OPERATIONS IN SEVEN
MOUNTAIN STATES AND WISCONSIN: A HYPOTHETICAL STUDY 14-15 (1983).
152. Evans, supra note 150, at 6.
153. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 1.
154. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 1, 3-4; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 23.11 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986).
155. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 3-4 (table 1-2); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 144.44 (West Supp. 1986).
156. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 3-4 (table 1-2); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 144.85, 144.86(3) (West Supp. 1986).
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tion 15 8 and a High Capacity Well Approval Application159 with Wiscon-
sin state agencies. By the end of 1986, Exxon, which was in the final
stages of obtaining the necessary permits, announced that it would post-
pone mining activities on the property until zinc and copper prices
increased. 16
0
The Wisconsin example illustrates some of the problems involved
with developing a mine on private land subject to state regulation. While
the state regulations have been designed to protect the state's environ-
ment, the lengthy and expensive permit process has done little to en-
courage future exploration and mining in the state.
c. state regulation of mineral exploration and mining on federal land
Conflicts between state and federal laws have arisen over mining ac-
tivity on federal land. Increased state regulation of activities affecting the
environment have clashed with federal policies of developing federal
land. For example, in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Co.,161 a corporation was engaged in mining limestone from unpatented
mining claims in a National Forest located in California.1 62 After secur-
ing approval of a five-year plan of operations from the United States For-
est Service, the company began mining operations in 1981. In 1983,
amidst environmentalists' protests against the mining operations, the
California Coastal Commission advised Granite Rock Company that
since its operations were within the California Coastal Zone, the com-
pany would have to obtain a state permit to continue mining.
163
Granite Rock sued the California Coastal Commission contending
that the California Coastal Commission permit requirement was pre-
empted by Forest Service regulations, the General Mining Law of 1872
and the Coastal Zone Management Act." The District Court for the
Northern District of California denied Granite Rock's motion for sum-
157. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 3-4 (table 1-2); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 144.391, 144.392 (West Supp. 1986).
158. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at'3-4 (table 1-2); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 147 et seq. (West Supp. 1986).
159. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 149, at 3; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.025(2)(e) (West Supp. 1986).
160. Wausau Daily Herald, Dec. 22, 1986, at 3A, col. 4.
161. 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
162. Id. at 1422.
163. Id. at 1423; see also Burling, Local Control of Mining Activities on Federal Lands, 21
LAND & WATER L. REV. 33, 35-36 (1986).
164. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. at 1423.
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mary judgment and dismissed the action. 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and held that an independent state permit system was
preempted by the General Mining Law of 1872 and the Forest Service's
permit authority.'6 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's ruling and held that the state permit requirements did
not conflict with federal law and were, therefore, not preempted. 167 The
Court's decision allows a state to regulate mining activities on federal
land provided the state's land management regulations do not conflict
with those of the federal government. The decision will undoubtedly
make it more difficult for mining companies to develop minerals on fed-
eral land. The dual regulatory requirements could discourage many indi-
viduals and mining companies from ever entering federal land to explore
for minerals where state regulations are too costly, difficult or time-con-
suming to meet.
3. The decline of the mining and mineral industry
Spokesmen for the mining industry often blame federal laws for
much of the nation's dependence on strategic mineral imports. Although
federal regulations may inhibit domestic mineral production, market
forces also contribute to the decreased production of domestic minerals.
The strength of the dollar and inexpensive labor abroad have contributed
to the United States' increased importation of minerals.168 During the
early part of the 1980's, oil companies purchased many of the prominent
domestic mining companies. As a result of the decrease in mineral
prices, the oil companies suffered hefty losses.1 69 Oil companies were
unwilling to invest the huge amounts of money required for mine devel-
opment at a time when mines were losing millions of dollars annually. 1
70
Oil company management cut back on both staff and operations and
tried to sell their interests in the mining industry. 171 Consequently, do-
mestic mineral production decreased and many owners closed their
mines.
165. Id. (citing Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1984)).
166. Id. (citing Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
167. Id. at 1424.
168. Houston, supra note 107, at 65-66.
169. Id. at 65.
170. See, e.g., id. at 70. Three years after Standard Oil Co. of Ohio (Sohio) acquired the
Bingham Canyon copper mine in Utah, Sohio began to reconsider its plans for investing one
billion dollars to modernize the mine. Id.
171. Houston, supra note 107, at 65; II UNITED STATES DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BU-
REAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK at 120 (1986).
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4. The future of domestic production of strategic minerals
The United States may never be self-sufficient in producing many of
the strategic minerals that it needs. Additionally, this country has aggra-
vated its plight by withdrawing land from mineral exploration and devel-
opment by placing environmental concerns ahead of concerns over
mineral vulnerability and by continuing to buy minerals from foreign
sources rather than supporting its own mining industry. Furthermore,
state laws have imposed even greater restrictions on mining on private
land. Conflicts between state and federal regulations have caused delays
and cessation of mining activities on federal land until the conflicts can
be resolved. Finally, the mining industry has not met the challenge from
foreign competitors and has, as a result, suffered severe economic harm.
At this point in time, the future of mining in this country is in serious
doubt. The United States, however, can adopt measures that could alle-
viate its dependence on strategic mineral imports.
B. Decreased Domestic Consumption of Strategic Minerals
By decreasing domestic consumption of strategic minerals, the
United States can help achieve independence from strategic mineral im-
ports. Conservation measures such as recycling of minerals and substitu-
tion of alternate materials for materials now composed of strategic
minerals could reduce domestic consumption.
1. Conservation
Conservation of strategic minerals has been a part of United States
strategic mineral policy since the enactment of the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946.172 Recently, Congress emphasized
conservation measures when it passed the National Materials and Miner-
als Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980.173 Congress author-
ized the President to support basic and applied research and development
to "improve[ ] methods for the extraction, processing, use, recovery, and
recycling of materials which encourage the conservation of materials, en-
ergy, and the environment .... 174
A program of new processing and manufacturing technologies
which increase production, save materials and improve efficiency of per-
formance could increase conservation of strategic materials. New and
172. Ch. 590, 60 Stat. 596, 596 (1946) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
173. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 (1982).
174. Id. § 1603(2)(C).
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improved processes in the manufacture of steel and alloys could save
both energy and strategic minerals.'75 Development of mechanical or
electrical parts requiring smaller quantities of strategic minerals or of




Recycling differs from other forms of conservation because it helps
to increase available mineral supplies. 177 Recycling has been a part of
United States strategic mineral policy since 1970 when Congress declared
that "[tihe time has passed when we can continue to ignore the need for
better utilization of wornout and castoff metal and mineral products. We
must begin to mine our scrap piles."'
178
While recycling has been incorporated as a part of United States
strategic mineral policy in both the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of
1970171 and the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and
Development Act of 1980,18' no federal legislation has been enacted by
Congress that mandates the development of a major strategic minerals
recycling industry.' 8 ' Because there is no effective federal recycling pol-
icy, the responsibility has fallen on private industry to recycle when it is
economically and technologically feasible to do so.182 Since prices and
availability of strategic minerals have remained relatively stable in recent
years,' 83 there is currently little incentive for private industry to develop
recycling programs to recover strategic minerals.
Shortages or sharp increases in strategic mineral prices could pro-
vide the incentive private industry needs to increase its recycling efforts.
For example, as a result of the Canadian nickel strike in 1969 and the
sharp increase in the world cobalt price in 1978, U.S. industry nearly
175. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 216.
176. Id. at 216-17.
177. Id. at 215.
178. H.R. REP. No. 1442, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5792, 5794.
179. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982).
180. 30 U.S.C. § 1603(2)(C) (1982).
181. See OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 375. Federal recycling programs have concen-
trated on research and development of recycling processes, but there has been a lack of interest
by private industry to adopt expensive new recycling technology without economic incentives.
Id. at 376-78. Economic incentives might include federal subsidies, state or federal tax credits
or deductions, or lower prices for scrap as compared to buying the minerals from foreign
sources.
182. See OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 372, 377.
183. See generally Gibson, No One's Pet Rocks: Why Strategic Metals Have Fallen From
Favor, Barron's, Oct. 3, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
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tripled its consumption of nickel scrap in three years and doubled its
consumption of cobalt scrap within one year.184 Recycling is also a via-
ble means of satisfying the United States' increasing need for
platinum. 
18 5
3. Substitution for strategic minerals
The idea of finding substitutes for strategic minerals to reduce de-
pendency on foreign strategic mineral imports is not new.18 6 With the
passage of the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and De-
velopment Act of 1980 and the National Critical Materials Act of 1984,
the United States has placed greater emphasis on researching and devel-
oping new technologies, improving efficient use of strategic minerals and
discovering new substitutes for strategic minerals to lessen its depen-
dence on strategic minerals.
187
While the United States could reduce its need for some vital strate-
gic minerals by using substitute materials,' 88 not all strategic minerals
can be replaced.' 8 9 Also, research and development of adequate substi-
tutes for strategic minerals is time consuming and expensive. The re-
search and development effort could take ten or more years and cost
millions of dollars.190 American manufacturers are unlikely to engage in
such research and development unless it will result in lower costs, better
184. See OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 257.
185. SIERRA RESEARCH AND ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, INC., OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT WORKING PAPER, CRITICAL METAL CONSUMPTION IN AUTO-
MOBILE CATALYSTS: TRENDS AND ALTERNATIVES 1 (1983) (CIS J952-53 1985). Automo-
bile emission controls are now consuming over 800,000 troy ounces of platinum or about 25 or
30% of all platinum group metals this nation imports. Platinum use in automotive emission
controls is expected to increase by 80% over the next decade. As much as one half of the
platinum used by the United States could be recycled by the mid 1990's. However, accom-
plishing this will require a concerted effort from government and private industry. Id.
186. See Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946, Ch. 590, 60 Stat. 596,
599-600 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Defense
Production Act of 1950 was also amended in 1955 to include this provision: "When in his
judgment it will aid the national defense, the President may make provision for the develop-
ment of substitutes for strategic and critical materials." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2093(g) (1982).
187. See National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980,
30 U.S.C. § 1603(2)(D) (1982); National Critical Materials Act of 1984, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b),
1804, 1805 (Supp. III 1985).
188. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 266. The authors estimated that one-third of the na-
tion's chromium demand could be eliminated through the use of immediately available substi-
tutes. Id.
189. Id. at 266-67. The steel making industry has no adequate substitute for manganese as
an additive in steel. Until researchers develop new processes that will reduce the amount
needed to produce steel, manganese will remain an essential ingredient for making the metal.
See id. at 27, 55, 266.
190. Id. at 267.
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performance and new market penetration. 19' The federal government's
objectives of reduced import consumption, materials conservation and
maintenance of national industrial competitiveness may conflict with
American industry objectives. 92 American industry may be unwilling to
support a federal policy of materials substitution research unless the in-
dustry benefits economically.
While the federal government has sponsored many research and de-
velopment programs for strategic mineral substitutes, industry has been
reluctant to use strategic mineral substitutes in its commercial manufac-
turing unless clear benefits exist in terms of cost and performance.
9 3
Dependence on strategic minerals for most of this nation's present uses is
likely to continue unless the government takes steps to apply its strategic
minerals substitution projects to large scale manufacturing settings, or
until American manufacturers realize that using substitutes for strategic
minerals leads to economic benefits.
C. Alternative Sources for Strategic Minerals
The United States has few options to attain independence from for-
eign imports-especially since domestic programs cannot adequately
achieve this goal. If imports are necessary, one possible solution is to
diversify foreign strategic mineral sources. Another alternative which
may create less dependence on other nations is to obtain many of our
strategic minerals from the sea floor.
1. Diversification of strategic mineral supply among
multiple foreign sources
Because the United States relies on a small number of countries for
most of its strategic mineral imports, serious disruptions in the United
States' strategic mineral supplies could result from a single country's fail-
ure to provide strategic minerals. 94 By relying on a large number of
foreign countries for its strategic mineral requirements, the United States
191. Id. at 265-67.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 267. The Department of Energy, USBM and NASA sponsor strategic mineral
substitute programs. These programs, however, are years and millions of dollars away from
completion. Id.
194. Over 99% of the world's chromium resources are located in southern Africa. MIN.
ERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2, at 35. Between 1981 and 1984, 67% of
the chromium the United States imported came from South Africa and Zimbabwe. Id. at 34.
The United States imported between 76 and 90% of the chromium that it needed during this
period. The United States also depends on approximately 20 countries for nearly all of its
columbium, manganese, mica, strontium, bauxite, cobalt, platinum and tantalum. See id. at 2.
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could diversify its sources of strategic minerals. Because countries like
South Africa and Zaire hold a virtual monopoly on platinum, cobalt,
manganese and chromium, it would be prudent for the American govern-
ment to encourage other nations to explore for and develop strategic
minerals which meet the nation's needs. This alternative is, however,
subject to failure when political changes in developing countries erase
mining investments which cost millions of dollars and take years of
work. 195 The expense and time involved in developing new mineral re-
sources presents another complication-investors may be unwilling to
wait years for an uncertain return on their investment. 196 Thus, invest-
ment by private industry in developing mineral deposits overseas has de-
clined during the last twenty years.
197
Despite the uncertainties in foreign mining investment, U.S. strate-
gic mineral policy has not ignored the idea of diversifying foreign sources
for its strategic minerals. The National Materials and Minerals Policy,
Research and Development Act of 1980 requires that the United States
seek multilateral and bilateral agreements with other nations to ensure
adequate strategic material supplies. 198 Both the USBM and USGS are
actively engaged in assessing strategic mineral resources of foreign na-
tions.1 99 The Reagan Administration has also encouraged international
strategic mineral development through the Trade and Development Pro-
gram of the International Development Cooperation Agency.2" Fund-
ing levels for this program, however, have been too low to produce a
significant amount of diversification.20 So far, efforts by President Rea-
gan and Congress to diversify strategic mineral sources have been
195. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 357. During the late 1940's and early 1950's, the
United States, in an attempt to diversify its nickel market, tried to help develop Cuba's nickel
resources. The attempt succeeded but the United States was never able to reap the rewards of
its investment after the Castro regime took control of Cuba. Id.
196. Id. Once a mineral deposit has been discovered, a mine developer will need at least
two to five years to develop a mine and to begin mineral production. The total cost from
exploration to production could exceed a billion dollars. Id.
197. Id.
198. National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, 30
U.S.C. § 1603(9) (1982). Under the Act, the President shall, through his executive agencies,
"assess the opportunities for the United States to promote cooperative multilateral and bilat-
eral agreements for materials development in foreign nations for the purpose of increasing the
reliability of materials supplies to the Nation." Id.
199. Under the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act,
"[t]he Secretary of the Interior shall promptly initiate actions to ... improve the capacity of
the Bureau of Mines to assess international minerals supplies ...." Id. § 1604(e)(1); see also
OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 357-58.
200. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 358.
201. Id.
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unsuccessful.2 °2
2. Sea floor mining
During the 1870's, scientific expeditions discovered manganese nod-
ules on the sea floor.20 3 Since then, private industry and government
have taken an increasing interest in mining the sea floor. In the last
thirty years, technology has advanced sufficiently to make sea floor min-
ing feasible. The recent discovery of copper-nickel-cobalt deposits along
oceanic spreading centers2°' has increased international interest in min-
ing sea floor deposits.
Congress, realizing that sea floor mineral resources could potentially
reduce U.S. strategic mineral dependence, enacted the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act in 1980.205 Through the Act, Congress endorsed
the goals of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
Treaty."0 6 Specifically, Congress affirmed the Treaty's objective of pro-
viding a new international legal order for exploration and commercial
recovery of mineral resources from the sea floor.20 7
In 1982, after eight years of negotiations, the Law of the Sea Treaty
was signed by 117 nations.208 President Reagan, however, refused to add
202. Id. at 358-61.
203. Briscoe & Lambert, Seabed Mineral Discoveries Within National Jurisdiction and the
Future of the Law of the Sea, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 433, 443 (1984).
204. Id. at 433-34. Oceanic spreading centers are areas on the ocean floor where the
oceanic crustal plates are pulling apart from each other. Molten magma wells up in the cracks
where the crustal plates have pulled apart, and the interaction of the seawater with the molten
magma forms mineral deposits. Ballard & Grassle, Incredible World of the Deep-sea Rifts, 156
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 680, 688, 702-03 (1979).
205. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Congress stated in section 1401(a) of
the Act that:
(1) the United States' requirements for hard minerals to satisfy national indus-
trial needs will continue to expand and the demand for such minerals will increas-
ingly exceed the available domestic sources of supply;
(2) in the case of certain hard minerals, the United States is dependent upon
foreign sources of supply and the acquisition of such minerals from foreign sources is
a significant factor in the national balance-of-payments position;
(3) the present and future national interest of the United States requires the
availability of hard mineral resources which is independent of the export policies of
foreign nations;
(4) there is an alternate source of supply, which is significant in relation to
national needs, of certain hard minerals, including nickel, copper, cobalt, and manga-
nese, contained in the nodules existing in great abundance on the deep seabed ....
30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)-(4) (1982).
206. Id. § 1401(a)(7)-(8).
207. Id. § 1401(a)(8).
208. Richardson, Superpowers Need Law: A Response to the United States Rejection of the
Law of the Sea Treaty, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1982). Although the Law of
the Sea Treaty was signed by 117 nations, the Treaty will not come into force until 12 months
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his signature20 9 to the Treaty because he was unhappy with the deep sea-
bed mining provisions. However, he did not specifically state his objec-
tions to those provisions.210
Although the United States has established a national policy for
deep seabed mining, President Reagan's failure to sign the Law of the Sea
Treaty has caused some mining companies to refrain from mining the
seabed beyond the United States' 200 mile exclusive economic zone.211
American industry may be reluctant to invest money in a mining opera-
tion that may be illegal under domestic law.2 12 Furthermore, American
mining companies will be unwilling to invest hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in sea floor mining when their rights to mine sea bed minerals in
waters outside the jurisdiction of the United States may not be recog-
nized by countries abiding by the provisions of the Law of the Sea
after the Treaty has been ratified by the sixtieth country. United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 308, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter UN-
CLOS]. As of Oct. 20, 1986, only 31 countries had ratified the Treaty. 2 K. SIMMONDS, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA U.3, 1(1987) (citing U.N. Doc. A/41/742 at 5 (1986)).
209. Richardson, supra note 208, at 1.
210. Id. The President's refusal to sign the treaty may have had to do with his concern over
subjecting United States economic activity to control by a supranational body. Id. at 2 n.6 and
accompanying text. Although the Law of the Sea Treaty establishes broad policy-making au-
thority in a "'one nation, one vote'" Assembly, a 36-member executive Council would make
most daily decisions concerning seabed mining. Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty?, 54 FoR-
EIGN PoL'Y 44, 53 (1984); see also UNCLOS, supra note 208, art. 159-62.
James Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs and Special Representative of President Reagan to the Law of the Sea
Conference, has argued that the United States does not have adequate representation on the
executive Council in proportion to the amount of financial support this country would be
required to provide and to the interest it has in being one of the few countries capable of
actually mining the seabed. Malone, supra, at 53. Additionally, Malone indicated that the
Reagan Administration views the seas as "belonging to no country or individual but open to
those willing to take the risk and invest the labor necessary to derive benefit from the abundant
resources the seas contain .. " Id. at 45. Malone contrasted the U.S. view with UNCLOS'
"distorted interpretation of the noble concept of the Earth's vast oceans as the 'common heri-
tage of mankind."' Id.
211. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. Although the United States has not signed
the Law of the Sea Treaty, it has claimed a 200 mile exclusive economic zone similar to that of
UNCLOS. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983). The exclusive economic zone
as described in UNCLOS recognizes the coastal State's "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living .... of the sea-bed and its subsoil.. . ." UNCLOS, supra note 208, art. 56(l)(a).
"The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. art. 57.
212. Section 1411 of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1473 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), prohibits any U.S. citizen from engaging in any exploration or
commercial recovery without a license or permit issued by the United States or reciprocating
state, or by international agreement unless such an agreement is in force with respect to the
United States. 30 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (1982).
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Treaty.213 Thus, until there is international agreement on seabed mining
rights, it is unlikely that the United States can rely on seabed mining to
reduce its dependence on strategic mineral imports.
V. Loss OF AMERICAN MINERAL PROCESSING CAPABILITY: A
NEW FACTOR AFFECTING U.S. STRATEGIC MINERAL
VULNERABILITY
Until recently, the United States either produced or imported the
strategic minerals it needed and then processed the raw minerals into
alloys. During the last decade, however, the United States has become
increasingly dependent on foreign sources, not only for its strategic min-
erals, but for processed materials made from strategic minerals.2 14 The
foreign processed materials have enjoyed a competitive edge over their
American counterparts, possibly because of lower labor and production
costs. 215 As a result, many American industries that once processed raw
imported strategic minerals have now gone out of business.21 6 The dan-
ger resulting from this trend is that even if the United States has the
213. Richardson, supra note 208, at 12. Elliott Richardson, former Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1977-80, was not optimistic
about the prospect of U.S. industry engaging in seabed mining without an international
agreement:
Will U.S. companies have the opportunity to engage in deep seabed mining outside
the treaty? The clear answer is no. To accept the notion that assured access to the
deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction might somehow be afforded by
a reciprocating states agreement or mini-treaty is sheer folly. I know of no one who
believes that a nickel will ever be invested by U.S. companies on a legal foundation
resting solely on U.S. legislation purporting to authorize deep seabed mining outside
the Treaty. The right to mine in extraterritorial waters is a matter of international
law, and a version of international law that is not widely accepted would be a frail
reed on which to risk a billion dollars or more.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Richardson's prediction may be accurate. Seabed mining rights are developing along two
tracks: (1) those nations adhering to UNCLOS and (2) nations like the United States who are
developing separate agreements with other nations who have not signed or ratified UNCLOS.
J. BROADUS, SEABED MINING, REPORT TO OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT 2 (1984)
(Office of Technology Assessment Working Paper) (CIS J952-58 1985). By 1984, several ma-
jor companies previously engaged in developing technology to mine seabed minerals had with-
drawn altogether or had declined to make further expenditures. Id. at 1. Consortia, still
engaged in seabed mining development, restricted their efforts to acquiring assured access to
preferred prospective mining sites on the seabed either through one or the other mining rights
tracks. Id. at 2. For a discussion of the political, economic and security risks associated with
unilateral deep seabed mining, see Jones, Risk Assessment: Corporate Ventures in Deep Seabed
Mining Outside the Framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 341 (1986).




strategic minerals in its stockpile during times of crisis, it may not have
the manufacturing capability to produce the needed materials from the
stockpiled minerals.
2 17
Foreign imports of processed strategic minerals have greatly affected
the ferroalloys industry in America. Before manganese ore can be added
to the steel making process, it must be made into a ferroalloy called fer-
romanganese.218 In 1974, the United States produced approximately sev-
enty percent of its ferromanganese requirements.2 19 By 1983, United
States ferromanganese production had decreased to approximately seven
percent of domestic consumption.220 From 1981 to 1984, South Africa
provided thirty-nine percent of the ferromanganese imported by the
United States.221 Heavy reliance on one country for materials manufac-
tured from strategic minerals may increase the United States' vulnerabil-
ity to supply cutoffs or sharp price increases. The problem is further
compounded where the foreign nation producing the materials made
from strategic minerals is also the dominant producer of the mineral it-
self. The problem is especially apparent in the case of American reliance
on South Africa for ferromanganese made from South African
manganese.
While Japan and European countries have taken steps to preserve
key industries such as the ferroalloys industry, the United States has
done little to prevent such industries from deteriorating.222 Further-
more, the United States may not appreciate how much it actually relies
on foreign nations for materials manufactured from strategic minerals.
Currently, there does not appear to be an accurate accounting of the
quantity of strategic minerals imported by the United States in the form
of both processed and manufactured goods.2 23 As a result, the United
217. Id.; see also Geopolitics, supra note 21, at 185 (statement of A.L. Bement, Jr., Vice
President, Technical Resources, TRW Inc.), 354 (statement of A.E. Eckes, Chairman, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm.).
218. Geopolitics, supra note 21, at 142 (statement of John P. Trunzo, President, Elkem Met-
als Co.).
219. Id. at 142-43.
220. Id.
221. MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1986, supra note 2, at 98.
222. Geopolitics, supra note 21, at 124 (statement of George Watson, President, The Ferro-
alloys Association). While the United States has been engaged in upgrading the strategic min-
eral stockpile with ferromanganese, it may fall short of meeting the nation's requirements in
times of national emergency. Id. at 125.
223. See Letter from Dr. William Dresher to Larry Bradfish (Sept. 16, 1986) (copy on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Office). Dr. Dresher is President of International Copper
Research Association, Inc. and was a member of President Reagan's Strategic Minerals Task
Force formed as part of the Transition Team when President Reagan was elected. Dr. Dresher
suggests that the focus of strategic mineral vulnerability should be on the loss of domestic
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States may be ignoring a crucial factor in its strategic mineral policy.
The loss of industries like the ferroalloys industry, accompanied by this
nation's increasing dependence on materials containing strategic miner-
als that are manufactured outside the United States, could result in a
serious increase in U.S. strategic mineral vulnerability.
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been a subject of
increasing debate in this country during the last ten years.224 On one side
are those who believe that human rights are the internal affairs of indi-
vidual nations. Accordingly, they argue that the United States should
not interfere with other countries' human rights decisions and American
foreign policy should not be influenced by human rights considera-
tions.225 On the other side are those who want the United States to im-
pose strict sanctions on countries that deprive their citizens of human
rights.226 Advocates of this latter approach would argue that U.S. for-
eign policy should revolve around human rights considerations. The
middle ground is occupied by those who believe that decisionmakers
should formulate U.S. foreign policy by balancing human rights consid-
erations against the nation's national security and economic interests.
227
Although the views of most U.S. decisionmakers occupy the middle
ground of the human rights debate,228 there are a number of problems
associated with balancing human rights concerns with other interests.
One problem is that the term "human rights" means different things to
different people. For example, human rights could be limited to personal
and legal rights, or they could also include political and economic
rights. 229 Another problem is raised by the issue of whether human
manufacturing capability rather than on the nation's dependence on strategic mineral imports.
Id.
224. Bite, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 1, LIaR. OF CONGRESS, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERVICE (Issue Brief No. IBS 1125) (updated Nov. 24, 1982).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 4-5.
228. Id.
229. The Carter Administration's human rights standards were criticized by one author as
being broader than those standards used by Amnesty International and previous U.S. foreign
policy statements:
[H]uman rights were defined not in terms of personal and legal rights-freedom from
torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and arrest, as in usage of Amnesty International
and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Acts of 1961 and 1975-but in accordance with a
much broader conception which included the political "rights" available only in de-
mocracies and the economic "rights" promised by socialism (shelter, food, health,
education).
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rights standards should be uniformly applied toward both friends and
foes of the United States.23° There is also disagreement among deci-
sionmakers about whether Congress or the President should implement
human rights policy.231
While the human rights issue was given a low priority by both the
Nixon and Ford Administrations, the Carter Administration made
human rights a "hallmark of its international strategy." '232 The Reagan
Administration, however, reduced the role of human rights considera-
tions in deciding foreign policy.233 Early in President Reagan's first
term, the United States adopted a policy of quiet diplomacy as a means
of encouraging human rights in other countries.2 34 The United States
was concerned with strengthening itself and its allies "against the spread
of totalitarian aggression., 2 35 In a speech before the Trilateral Commis-
sion in Washington on March 31, 1981, then Secretary of State Alexan-
der Haig outlined the imperatives of the Reagan human rights policy:
Thefirst imperative is to strengthen the United States, its allies
and friends, the main safeguard against the spread of totalitar-
ian aggression.
Second, we must improve our own example as a society dedi-
cated to justice.
Third, we should adopt a sense of proportion in dealing with
violators-the authoritarian versus the totalitarian regime.
Fourth, and finally, it is imperative that we examine the creden-
tials and program of the opposition as well as the govern-
ment-we must see clearly what change portends for human
rights in the future. 236
The third imperative of the Reagan Administration-that of distin-
guishing between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes when the United
States implements its human rights policy-had been previously pro-
posed by Jeane Kirkpatrick, professor of government at Georgetown
University. Kirkpatrick, who later became U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations under the Reagan Administration, suggested that when
weighing human rights considerations in formulating foreign policy to-
Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security & Latin America, 71 COMMENTARY 29, 32-33 (Jan. 1981).
230. Bite, supra note 224, at 4.
231. Id. at 4-5.
232. Rubin, Carter, Human Rights, and U.S. Allies, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 109, 110-11 (B. Rubin & E. Spiro eds. 1979).
233. Bite, supra note 224, at 2.
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ward a particular country, the United States should give greater defer-
ence to authoritarian rather than totalitarian regimes because
[t]raditional [noncommunist] autocrats leave in place existing
allocations of wealth, power, status, and other resources ....
They do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure,
habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and
personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are
familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up
in the society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables
in India acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for survival in
the miserable roles they are destined to fill. 37
The United States applied its quiet diplomacy approach toward
South Africa under the policy labelled "constructive engagement. '238 A
primary purpose of constructive engagement was to steer the United
States "'between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic
and aligning [itself] with the cause of white rule,' [and] then... contrib-
ute to the achievement of change in South Africa. 21 39 President Reagan
affirmed U.S. support of South Africa as "'a country that has stood be-
side us in every war we've ever fought, a country that strategically is
essential to the free world in its production of minerals.' "240
As early as 1981, however, the Reagan Administration, amidst pub-
lic and congressional criticism of its human rights policy, began to em-
brace the human rights issue as a part of its rhetoric. President Reagan
stated that "'the promotion of liberty has always been a central element
of our Nation's foreign policy. In my administration, human rights con-
siderations are important in all aspects of our foreign policy.' "241 De-
spite the apparent shift in emphasis on human rights from the selective
237. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, 68 COMMENTARY 34, 44 (Nov.
1979).
238. Ungar & Vale, South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
234, 234 (1985-86).
239. Id. at 238 (quoting Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs
for President Reagan).
240. Id. at 240.
241. Bite, supra note 224, at 3. Other Reagan Administration officials voiced statements
similar to President Reagan's:
Under this Administration, the protection and enhancement of human rights is a
principal goal of our foreign policy. Indeed, it shapes the fundamental purposes and
helps define the context of our international relationships ....
We believe that human rights practices are an important factor in our relation-
ship with other countries, and we Americans believe that when things are wrong,
they should be set right-that is our duty to help. Our law and our policy reflect
these deep feelings and draws strength and inspiration from them.
As the spokesman for the American people, this Administration opposes the
violation of human rights whether by ally or adversary, friend or foe. Ours is not a
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approach outlined by then Secretary of State Alexander Haig earlier in
1981242 to the more active approach trumpeted by the Reagan Adminis-
tration in late 1981,243 the United States continued to apply its policy of
constructive engagement to South Africa and to vacillate in its support of
another noncommunist autocracy, Chile.241 Meanwhile, the Reagan Ad-
policy of "selective indignation." Rather it is one of balanced and even-handed con-
demnation of human rights violations wherever they occur.
Id. (quoting testimony of Walter Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 14, 1981).
Concern by the Reagan Administration over criticism of its human rights policy
prompted Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, to issue an internal State Department memorandum stating that:
Congressional belief that we have no consistent human rights policy threatens to
disrupt important foreign policy initiatives. Human rights has been one of the main
avenues for domestic attack on the Administration's foreign policy.
A human rights policy means trouble, for it means hard choices which may
adversely affect certain bilateral relations. At the very least, we will have to speak
honestly about our friends' human rights violations and justify any decisions wherein
other considerations economic, military etc., are determinative. There is no escaping
this without destroying the credibility of our policy, for otherwise we would simply
[be] coddling friends and criticizing foes. Despite the costs of such a human rights
policy, it is essential.
Bite, supra note 224, at 3-4 (quoting Nov. 5, 1981 N.Y. Times article of excerpts from Abrams'
internal State Department memorandum).
242. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
243. Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066, 1070-71
(1986).
244. Id. at 1080, 1085. While the Reagan Administration appeared to reject quiet diplo-
macy as the only method for bringing about reforms in the human rights situation in Chile, it
wavered, taking two steps backward for every one it moved ahead, voting against
Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet at the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission and then voting for him, condemning him at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission but then allowing the World Bank and the IMF to proceed with plans
for loans.
Id. at 1085.
Chile controls more than 25% of the world's known copper reserves. Houston, supra
note 107, at 67. Chile depends on its state-run mining company, Corporacion Nacional del
Cobre de Chile (CODELCO) for 46% of its foreign exchange. In 1983, Chile provided the
United States with 46% of the copper it imported and 15% of all the copper used by American
manufacturers. Id.
The United States has helped finance Chile's policy of suppressing human rights through
this nation's continued importation of Chilean copper. Ten percent of Chile's copper revenues
are diverted by government decree to the armed forces. Id. Chile's armed forces as well as its
uniformed and secret police are involved in suppressing human rights. Human Rights in Chile,
supra note 21, at 50 (statement of John Healey, Executive Director, Amnesty Int'l USA). The
armed forces' human rights violations have not been confined to Chile. In 1976, Chilean exile
Orlando Letelier and an American associate were killed in a car bomb explosion in Washing-
ton D.C. A District of Columbia grand jury indicted three Chileans on charges of murder and
conspiracy to commit murder. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, at A6, col. 1. The three included
General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepfilveda, chief of the intelligence police, Colonel Pedro Es-
pinoza Bravo, operations director of the intelligence police, and Major Armando Fernindez
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ministration attacked the human rights record of the procommunist
Sandinista government in Nicaragua while it defended the tarnished
human rights record of the non-communist anti-Sandinista rebels.
2 4
When a South Korean airliner was shot down by the Soviet Union after
it entered Soviet airspace in 1983, President Reagan accused Moscow of
violating the human rights of the people on board the plane.
2 46
The apparent double standard in the Reagan human rights policy
toward communist and non-communist countries may be the result of
the definition of human rights adopted by the Reagan Administration
and the way it chose to implement its policy for geopolitical, rather than
humanitarian, purposes. The Reagan Administration narrowly defined
"human rights" to include political rights and civil liberties, but not eco-
nomic rights.247 Thus, the Reagan Administration might not have been
as willing to condemn a country who deprived its citizens of food, shel-
248 teeater, medicine and education,2  viewing these as "aspirations" rather
than as rights guaranteed to citizens by the state.249
Additionally, in balancing human rights considerations against
other U.S. interests, the Reagan Administration may have felt that geo-
political concerns outweighed humanitarian concerns. For example, to
the Reagan Administration, the danger of destabilizing nations friendly
to the United States may have outweighed the danger posed by their
human rights violations.250 Carried to an extreme, this may have in-
cluded using the human rights issue as a pawn in a propaganda war
against the communist bloc as well as for quelling domestic criticism of
its human rights policy.25" '
Regardless of the motives behind the Reagan Administration's pol-
icy toward human rights, the human rights situation in South Africa
continued to deteriorate.252 South Africa's formation of a tricameral
parliamentary system in 1983 excluded blacks and coincided with an un-
precedented outburst of violence that led to imposition of a state of emer-
Larios. Id. Major Fernhndez resigned from the army in January 1987 and flew to the United
States to plead guilty to the charge of being an accessory to the death of Letelier. Id.
245. Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1079.
246. Id. at 1076.
247. Bite, supra note 224, at 4; see also Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1071.
248. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
249. Bite, supra note 224, at 4.
250. Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1078.
251. See generally id.
252. Ungar & Vale, supra note 238, at 249-50; see also Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1080-81,
U.S. Policy on South Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomin. on African Aff. of the Conln. oil
Foreign Rel., U.S. Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy)
[hereinafter Kennedy statement).
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gency.253 Deaths, detentions and disappearances of hundreds of South
African blacks at the hands of South African authorities increased.254 In
March 1985, South African police opened fire on 4000 demonstrators.255
As with South Africa, the Reagan Administration's policy of using quiet
diplomacy to effect changes in Chile's human rights policy also failed as
General Pinochet tightened his control over the country.256
By 1985, under pressure from Congress, President Reagan, through
an executive order, imposed restrictions on trade between the United
States and South Africa.25 7 The restrictions appeared to be too little too
late. By the fall of 1986, Congress had voted to impose limited sanctions
on South Africa.258 In vetoing these proposed sanctions, President Rea-
gan argued that the sanctions would harm the blacks more than their
white leaders.259 Despite this purported concern for the welfare of South
Africa's blacks, strategic mineral dependence on South Africa remained
an underlying foreign policy concern of the Reagan Administration.26 °
United States dependence on strategic minerals from countries like
253. Ungar & Vale, supra note 238, at 249; see also Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1080; Ken-
nedy statement, supra note 252, at 3.
254. Ungar & Vale, supra note 238, at 249.
255. Jacoby, supra note 243, at 1081.
256. Human Rights in Chile, supra note 21, at 50 (statement of John Healey, Executive
Director, Amnesty Int'l USA.). In 1984, Chile declared a state of siege as opposition to the
Pinochet government increased. This resulted in mass arrests of citizens, raids on shantytowns
and disappearances and banishments of hundreds of Chilean citizens. Id.
257. National Emergency with Respect to South Africa, Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting Notification of a Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect
to South Africa, Pursuant to 50 US.C. 1703, H.R. Doc. No. 103, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. I
(1985). The trade restrictions included prohibition of bank loans to the South African govern-
ment, export of computers and related technology to South Africa, nuclear exports to South
Africa and imports of military goods made in South Africa. Id.
258. Sanctions imposed by the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 included a ban on imports of
steel, iron, uranium, coal, Krugerrand coins, textiles and agricultural products. See 132
CONG. REc. H8661 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986). Although the sanctions affected approximately
$350 million worth of South African imports to the United States, the United States imported
approximately $2.2 billion worth of South African goods in 1985. See U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, 1985 FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS A-15 (1986); 132 CONG. REC. S14637 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
259. See Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986- Veto Message from the President of the United States,
132 CONG. REC. H8648-49 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986).
260. In July 1986, after the House passed a bill requiring United States divestiture in South
Africa, then White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan was quoted as saying, "'[a]re the
women of America prepared to give up all their jewelry? .. . Are we telling ourselves that
industrial diamonds-things that we need for etching, cutting, shaping of tools and so forth-
that we now have to go, if anywhere, to the Soviet Union?' " L.A. Times, July 19, 1986, part I,
at 13, col. 1. Donald Regan was also reported to have warned that imposition of sanctions
would harm the United States because the United States depended on South Africa for manga-
nese, platinum, rhodium, chromium and diamonds. Id. at col. 1. Regan's remarks prompted
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South Africa and Chile might not be the ultimate factor that influences
American foreign policy. However, United States concern over the avail-
ability of strategic minerals from a strategic mineral producing country is
one factor decisionmakers weigh against human rights considerations
when formulating United States foreign policy.
VII. ATTAINMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC MINERAL POLICY GOALS: A
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The United States has had a strategic mineral policy for more than
forty years; yet this country remains dependent on foreign imports of
strategic minerals. The nation's quest for independence from foreign
sources of strategic minerals has failed, not because it lacks a strategic
mineral policy, but because this nation has failed to implement the strate-
gic mineral policies it has adopted. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act
of 1970 attempted to rectify the situation by expressly declaring a policy
of mineral self-sufficiency.261 Both the executive branch and the courts
have ignored the 1970 Act.2 62
Rep. Stephen Solarz to comment: "'What this proves is that the President's policy toward
South Africa is all carat and no stick.'" L.A. Times, July 18, 1986, part I, at 10, col. 1-2.
Shortly before the Senate followed the House of Representatives in voting to override
President Reagan's veto of the Anti-Apartheid Act, President Reagan sent Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole a letter concerning the sanctions against South Africa. 132 CONG. REC.
S14659 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (letter to R. Dole from President Reagan (Sept. 29, 1986)). In
his letter, President Reagan proposed imposing more restrictive measures against South Africa
through an expanded executive order in lieu of congressionally enacted sanctions. The Presi-
dent's proposed restrictions included:
A requirement to report and make recommendations on means of reducing U.S.
dependence on strategic minerals from southern Africa;
A requirement to report on whether any of these prohibitions has had the effect
of increasing U.S. or allied dependence on the Soviet bloc for strategic or other criti-
cal materials, with a view to appropriate modifications of U.S. measures under my
Executive order should such dependency have been increased ....
Id. at S14660.
261. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982).
262. See, e.g., Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235, 239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976). An applicant for
a coal prospecting permit was denied a permit after the Secretary of the Interior issued an
order prohibiting the issuance of permits "'in order to allow the preparation of a program for
the more "orderly" development of coal resources upon the public lands of the United States
under the Mineral Leasing Act, with proper regard for the protection of the environment.'"
Id. at 237. The applicant challenged the ruling based in part on the argument that the Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 directed the Secretary to "carry out a policy of fostering and
encouraging the development of coal resources and that the order suspending the issuance of
prospecting permits constituted an abuse of discretion in light of that Act .... " Id. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Secretary's order did not constitute an abuse of discre-
tion under the MMPA. The court found no inconsistency between the Secretary's order and
the purpose of the MMPA and noted that the suspension of the permits was not permanent.
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On the other hand, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,263 which was passed by Congress a year before the Mining and
Minerals Policy Act of 1970, has flourished and has become a major
body of statutory law.264 National concern for the environment appar-
ently has been of greater priority to the nation than its concern for its
mineral supply. Similarly, national concerns over preservation of wilder-
ness areas, solar energy and clean air have been given greater attention
by Congress than the problem of national dependence on foreign sources
of minerals.
The result is that one set of congressionally created national policy
goals conflicts with other national goals.265 Concerns for clean air and
alternative energy sources can have the effect of increasing demand for
strategic minerals.266 Increased demand for strategic minerals required
by alternative energy systems, used to reduce pollution, creates more
mineral exploration and mining activities in the United States for domes-
tically available minerals. Ironically, the result may be increased mining
activity on public lands, and potential air and water pollution from min-
ing and smelting activities. While the United States could import the
minerals that it needs, increased importation would risk compromising
national security and foreign policy decisions. Congress recognized this
conflict of policies when it developed our strategic mineral policy over
the past forty years.267 Unfortunately, the legislation enacted by Con-
gress has not eliminated the danger of compromises. Unless national pri-
orities are reorganized, it is unlikely that strategic mineral policy will
ever become a serious issue.
Some objectives of U.S. strategic mineral policy could be achieved,
however, if Congress coordinated them with other national priorities.
These objectives would have to be attained through an integrated pro-
gram implemented by the government over many years to reduce this
nation's dependence on foreign strategic minerals.
Id. at 239-40. The court also noted that the Secretary, in his order, had stressed environmental
considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Id. at 240-41.
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
264. U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY, supra note 11, at 17.
265. Id. at 33.
266. Id. at 34 n.5 1. Demand for cleaner air has caused Congress to tighten emission stan-
dards for automobiles. Consequently, more rhodium and platinum must be imported to act as
catalysts in automobile emission control systems. Gallium, an element needed in production
of solar energy cells, may have to be imported from foreign sources in increasing amounts to
meet growing domestic solar energy demands. Id.
267. See National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980,
30 U.S.C. § 1603(8) (1982); National Critical Materials Act of 1984, 30 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(9)
(Supp. III 1985).
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This Comment proposes a series of short term and long term objec-
tives designed to help reduce American dependence on strategic mineral
imports. The objectives are presented by this Comment with other na-
tional goals in mind.
A. Short Term Objectives
1. Strategic mineral stockpile goals
The mineral requirements of the national strategic stockpile should
vary with the relative scarcity of the stockpiled mineral. Some miner-
als-like silver-could be reduced from a three-year supply to a one-year
supply because of their relative domestic abundance. Stockpiles of min-
erals like chromium, platinum and cobalt should be increased to at least
five-year supplies so that the United States will have enough time to find
substitutes, implement recycling programs and develop any available do-
mestic resources. Shortages in chromium, platinum or cobalt could re-
sult from political upheavals or warfare in countries supplying these
minerals. Increased stockpiles would help alleviate shortages and pro-
vide additional time for the affected exporting countries to resolve their
problems and to resume mineral shipments.
2. Mineral surveys, recycling, and conservation
The USBM and USGS should jointly initiate domestic mineral ex-
ploration programs on lands withdrawn by Congress from mining under
the General Mining Law. It is imperative that the United States have an
accurate inventory of the minerals its lands contain. This goal can only
be accomplished by recurring mineral surveys that incorporate the most
recent geologic concepts and exploration techniques.2 68 By allowing only
federal agencies to evaluate the land, environmental damage would be
minimized because the number of explorationists examining the land
would be limited to those supervised by the agency. Furthermore, the
individuals examining the land would be directly accountable to the gov-
ernment for any damage to the environment.
Congress should not allow mining of any mineral reserves on with-
drawn public lands unless there is a national emergency. In this way, the
United States could catalog its domestic strategic mineral reserves with-
out depleting them or conflicting with the policy goals of protecting the
environment. Knowing the amount and locations of domestic strategic
minerals that are available would greatly facilitate exploiting them in
268. See Bennethum & Lee, supra note 133, at 40, for a discussion of cursory mineral evalu-
ations of wilderness areas and their problems.
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times when severe shortages occur, since the early exploration phase of
mineral development would already be completed.
Furthermore, the United States should require all mineral claimants
and lessees on federal land to provide the USBM and USGS with all
relevant geological, geophysical and geochemical data that they accumu-
late while engaging in prospecting on federal land. Exploration compa-
nies' concern over keeping their data confidential could be eased if the
data were submitted to the government only after the claimants or lessees
had relinquished their rights to the claims or leases.269 The data could
also be restricted to internal government use for a fixed period of time
before the government made the information available to the public. The
United States needs to have more knowledge of the geology and mineral
wealth of its public lands in order to more accurately assess its options in
times of mineral shortages.
The federal government should actively encourage recycling and
other conservation programs. Tax incentives or subsidies could foster
greater recycling efforts by private industry. More government money
should be spent on research and development in the field of materials
substitution. The government should also continue funding current
materials substitution projects to support the long term investment of
time and money researchers need to complete such projects.
3. Import considerations
Because the United States will never be self-sufficient in many strate-
gic minerals, it should diversify strategic minerals imports to avoid de-
pendence on a small number of countries for the minerals that it needs.
American money, technology and expertise in the field of mineral explo-
ration and mining could induce developing countries to give the United
States first priority in buying that country's minerals. By actively assist-
ing developing nations to market their mineral wealth, the United States
could be in an excellent position to receive a large share of the developing
country's exports.
Until the nations of the world agree to uniform rules concerning
seabed mining, it is unlikely that private industry will risk the time and
money needed to mine the bottom of the sea. It is essential, therefore,
that the United States either ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty or obtain
worldwide consensus on a new set of principles governing seabed mining.
269. Compare with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 156A.071 subd. 9 (West Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 107.15(4) (West Supp. 1986) (state statutes requiring disclosure of mineral exploration
data to state).
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The United States should implement a program to monitor imports
and ascertain the amount of strategic minerals imported by the nation in
the form of processed minerals and manufactured goods. The agency in
charge of such a program should pay particular attention to which coun-
tries export the goods and what effect importing the goods will have on
domestic manufacturing. Without accurate information on the effect
that imported processed and manufactured goods containing strategic
minerals have on the United States, Congress cannot successfully formu-
late an effective strategic mineral policy.
B. Long Term Objectives
1. Long term strategic mineral stockpile goals
The United States will have to spend at least one billion dollars per
year for the next thirteen years to increase supplies of strategic minerals
in the stockpile to levels that meet the three-year supply requirement of
the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiling Revision Act of 1979.27o
One problem the federal government faces is where to find the money in
a deficit-laden economy. Since strategic minerals have largely been a na-
tional defense concern, 27 this Comment suggests that the money should
come from the defense budget.
272
2. Long term mineral evaluations on public lands
Cataloging domestic mineral resources should be an ongoing pro-
cess by the USBM and USGS. A moratorium should be placed on con-
gressional and executive public land withdrawals from the General
Mining Law until more comprehensive mineral surveys can be conducted
on public lands. The nation needs more information on the mineral po-
270. OTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
271. See, e.g., THE AILING DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: UNREADY FOR CRISIS, REPORT
OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE PANEL OF THE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, H.R.
COMM. PRINT No. 29, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1980) (CIS No. H202-20 1980).
272. A detailed analysis of the defense budget is beyond the scope of this Comment. How-
ever, money could be obtained from the defense budget without affecting national security or
increasing the budget deficit since the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that between
1983 and 1985 defense budgets were funded in excess of $23.2 billion over what was necessary
to cover rising costs due to inflation. CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, CONG. BUDGET OF-
FICE, BUDGETING FOR DEFENSE INFLATION 1 (1986). Because Congress does not have accu-
rate methods for accounting for these "inflation dividends," the location and use of this money
often remains unknown. Id. at 21-23; see also J. EPSTEIN, THE 1987 DEFENSE BUDGET 51-52
(1986). This Comment suggests that Congress should develop accurate methods for account-
ing for overfunding of the defense budget and that it should use all or part of any excess
appropriated funds for rebuilding the strategic mineral stockpile.
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tential of its public lands before the lands are excluded from all mining
activities.
3. Conservation projects
The federal government should initiate long term projects to find
substitutes for strategic minerals. The projects should be carried out un-
til fully developed into commercial ventures. Materials substitution re-
search projects must be carried out to the point where substitutes are
developed on a large scale manufacturing basis, not just in the labora-
tory. Unless the government can show private industry that material
substitutes are cost effective in replacing strategic minerals in private in-
dustry's present manufacturing processes, it is unlikely that private in-
dustry will be willing to spend the money to develop the laboratory
findings on a commercial manufacturing scale. Joint federal and private
industry material substitution research programs would help assure that
private industry would adopt the results of those programs, since private
interests would then have a stake in the research and development of
substitute materials.
Both the government and private industry should make recycling
programs a part of their policy and should engage in research projects
aimed at improving recycling technology. One incentive for encouraging
recycling programs would be for the federal government to place tariffs
on selected strategic minerals to make recycling programs more econom-
ically attractive. The effect of the tariff system, however, must be bal-
anced with the United States' desire to encourage foreign countries to
develop their strategic mineral resources and to sell their minerals to the
United States.
4. The future of seabed mining
Because of the expense and risk involved in recovering minerals
from the sea floor, the federal government should subsidize the develop-
ment of a seabed mining industry. Private industry and the government
should engage in joint programs to develop the technology needed to
economically mine deep sea minerals. Government participation in such
projects could also help expedite mining activities, since mining compa-
nies may have to deal with an international organization to obtain the
necessary permits to engage in sea floor mining.273 It is also important
that the federal government monitor all phases of seabed mining of stra-
273. See Richardson, supra note 208, at 2-3.
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tegic minerals to effectively reevaluate its strategic mineral policy as the
minerals are extracted from the seabed.
5. Mining in Outer Space
The recovery of mineral resources in outer space may be another
alternative open to the United States during the next century. However,
in addition to the formidable technological and financial obstacles to
mining the moon, asteroids, and other planets, there also may be legal
ones. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies 74 states that "[t]he exploration and use of outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies ... shall be the province of
all mankind." '275 Additionally, the activities of all state parties to the
Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space including the moon and
other celestial bodies must be done in accordance with international
law.2 76 Because the United States is a party to this Treaty, it may not be
able to exploit mineral resources in outer space without adhering to in-
ternational rules and regulations. This situation appears to be similar to
the one that the Reagan Administration has sought to avoid in the Law
of the Sea Treaty.2 77 Thus, unless the United States is willing to conduct
its outer space mining activities in accordance with international law, it
may not be able to utilize this option to reduce its strategic mineral
vulnerability.
6. The future of American strategic mineral processing and
manufacturing industries
The United States should also consider subsidizing critical indus-
tries in the United States that are responsible for manufacturing goods
and materials from strategic minerals where such industries are exper-
iencing hardship as a result of foreign competition. While tariffs on im-
ports of certain manufactured goods made from strategic minerals may
274. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
275. Art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 207, 207-08. This lan-
guage in the Treaty resembles that used in the Law of the Sea Treaty which describes seabed
resources as the "common heritage of mankind." See supra note 210. Thus, the language of
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space appears to contradict the Reagan Administration's viev that mineral resources
beyond territorial boundaries belong to no country or individual but are open to those with the
capability of exploiting them. See id.
276. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. III, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 208.
277. See supra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
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not be the best answer, Congress could adopt less antagonistic measures.
Such measures might include low interest loans and tax incentives to
help the industry modernize and become more competitive. a78 Without
the continued existence of key industries such as the ferroalloys industry
in the United States, it will be impossible for the United States, in times
of crisis, to make the materials -it needs from strategic minerals even if
the minerals are available in the nation's stockpile. A strategic mineral
policy which ignores this important factor is likely to fail in a national
emergency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States is in need of an effective strategic mineral policy.
Without one, our national security is threatened and our foreign policy is
rendered confusing and hypocritical. American strategic mineral policy
is important not just for developing adequate future supplies of strategic
minerals; it is also important for preserving our role as a world leader.
Without an effective strategic mineral policy, the United States will al-
ways be vulnerable to embargo threats or price hikes from countries
which hold a monopoly on the strategic minerals this country needs for
both military and civilian uses. This form of blackmail could cause the
United States to adopt a foreign policy that is inconsistent with our dem-
ocratic principles. In particular, our policy toward human rights in
other countries may be especially vulnerable to pressures exerted by a
strategic mineral producing country that provides the United States with
nearly all its needs for a particular strategic mineral.
Unless U.S. strategic mineral vulnerability is alleviated, it will con-
tinue to be a factor weighed by Congress and the President against
human rights considerations. As a result, United States foreign policy
may be unnecessarily skewed toward geopolitical rather than humanita-
rian concerns. Without a consistent policy toward human rights, the
United States is in danger of losing its credibility as a world leader.
Without the influence of a moral world leader such as the United States,
worldwide supression of human rights may go unchallenged and un-
278. Geopolitics, supra note 21, at 126 (discussing use of break-point pricing for ferroalloys).
Under a system of break-point pricing, the cost of a particular imported good would have to be
the same price as the same goods manufactured in the United States by the most efficient
domestic producers. Any imports that are below this price would be assessed a tariff penalty
by the United States. Id. The result may be less restrictive on foreign imports than a pure
tariff system because imports at or above the break-point price would not have a tariff imposed
on them. Furthermore, American producers who were not as efficient as their domestic com-
petition would eifher be forced to become more competitive or would have to close down their
operations. Id.
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checked. Terrorism may increase as the only means available to op-
pressed people to counter supression of human rights.
Because supplies of strategic minerals are dependent on many com-
plex factors, it will take years for the United States to significantly reduce
its dependence on foreign imports. Therefore, it is essential that stronger
legislation be enacted by Congress as soon as possible, and that current
strategic mineral policy be implemented and followed immediately by
both the executive and legislative branches. It is even more important,
however, that both Congress and the President commit themselves to
such a policy.
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